Cleveland State University

EngagedScholarship@CSU
Law Faculty Articles and Essays

Faculty Scholarship

12-19-1978

Perceptions of Judicial Responsibility: The Views of the Nine
United States Supreme Court Justices as They Consider Claims in
Fourteenth Amendment Noncriminal Cases: A Post-Bakke
Evaluation
Arthur R. Landever
Cleveland State University, a.landever@csuohio.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/fac_articles
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Judges Commons

How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
Original Citation
Perceptions of Judicial Responsibility: The Views of the Nine United States Supreme Court Justices as
They Consider Claims in Fourteenth Amendment Noncriminal Cases: A Post-Bakke Evaluation, 14 Wake
Forest Law Review 1097 (1978)

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Law Faculty Articles and Essays by an authorized administrator of
EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact research.services@law.csuohio.edu.

+(,121/,1(
Citation: 14 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1097 1978
Content downloaded/printed from
HeinOnline (http://heinonline.org)
Wed Mar 6 18:08:00 2013
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance
of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license
agreement available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from
uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope
of your HeinOnline license, please use:
https://www.copyright.com/ccc/basicSearch.do?
&operation=go&searchType=0
&lastSearch=simple&all=on&titleOrStdNo=0043-003X

WAKE FOREST
LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 14

DECEMBER 1978

NUMBER 6

PERCEPTIONS OF JUDICIAL
RESPONSIBILITY-THE VIEWS OF THE
NINE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
JUSTICES AS THEY CONSIDER CLAIMS
IN FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
NONCRIMINAL CASES:
A POST-BAKKE EVALUATION
Arthur Landever*
TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.

II.

III.

INTRODUCTION .......................................

1098

THE JUSTICES ........................................

1101

JUSTICE BRENNAN ................................
JUSTICE MARSHALL ..............................
JUSTICE REHNQUIST .............................
JUSTICE POWELL .................................
CHIEFJUSTICE BURGER ..........................
JUSTICE WHITE ..................................
JUSTICE STEWART ................................
JUSTICE BLACKMUN ..............................
JUSTICE STEVENS ................................

1101
1108
1112
1116
1124
1128
1133
1137
1141
1145
1147
1147

WHO SPEAKS FOR THE COURT? ......................
THE COLLECTIVE PORTRAIT .........................

A.
*

The Court's View of Its Responsibilities ............

Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State University.

A.B., J.D., Ph.D., New York University. The author gratefully acknowledges the support
of a Cleveland-Marshall Fund grant, enabling him to do research in this area during the
summer 1977.

1097

HeinOnline -- 14 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1097 1978

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14

B.

IV.

An Assessment of the Collective View .............. 1151
1. The inclination to rely upon the state courts ....1151
2. The disposition to be supportive of the political
organs ..................................... 1153
CONCLUSION ......................................... 1155
INTRODUCTION

Each Justice of the United States Supreme Court has a particular
conception about his function. His notion of judicial responsibility is
really a composite of overlapping commitments; yet in any given case,
a single value is likely to predominate. One Justice may see his responsibility as primarily to assure broad redress for the politically
weak or insular, or indeed, even for John Q. Public. Another may
identify some operating principle that determines his response to the
actions of political institutions. A third may reject any movement to
establish constitutional guarantees unknown to the framers, and may
voice criticism of broad judicial remedies that are almost legislative in
form or effect. Still another may emphasize the importance of the
states in our federal republic.
Some of the Justice's actions may be ad hoc; in the main, however, his view of his task-and the attendant constitutional values at
stake-is significant in his own decision-making process. His perception takes on increased importance in fourteenth amendment situations. The amendment's assurances of due process and equal protection are deemed by most observers to speak in general terms1 that
are "as comprehensive as possible." 2 Furthermore, at least the latter
clause is thought to possess no constitutional principle to direct the
Justices. 3 Accordingly, a Justice may find little guidance in the
1. See, e.g., F. FRANKFURTER, MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND THE SUPREME COURT 7
(1938) in R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY-THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 193 n.2 (1977); P. FREUND, ON LAW AND JUSTICE 35 (1968);
L. HAND, SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 172-73 (I. Dillard ed. 1952) in BERGER, supra at 166 n.4;
L. LEVY, AGAINST THE LAW: THE NIXON COURT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 27 (1974) in
BERGER, supra at 194 n.3; W. MENDELSON, JUSTICES BLACK AND FRANKFURTER: CONFLICT IN THE COURT viii (1961) in BERGER, supra at 194 n.3. But Raoul Berger, supra
disagrees contending that the framers clearly envisioned the amendment to have a definite and quite limited scope-essentially to assure that blacks would have the same
rights as whites in contract and property transactions, and freedom from physical violence. BERGEn, supra at 35-36.
2. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 649 (1966); Strauder v. Virginia, 100 U.S.

303, 310 (1879).
3. Karst, The Supreme Court 1976 Term-Equal Citizenship under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1, 4 (1977) (principle of equal citizenship contained
within equal protection clause); see Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 777 (1977) (Rehn-

quist, J., dissenting). But see Michelman, The Supreme Court 1968 Term-On Protect-
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amendment's language and history; consequently, his discretion and
thus his hierarchy of personal values may assume primacy.
In this article, the author sketches each Justice by examining his
expressed attitudes 4 and silent concurrences 5 in fourteenth amendment noncriminal 6 cases, as well as his remarks in other, non-court
settings. While judicial behavioralists 7 have employed quantitative
techniques focusing upon analysis of voting records, the author believes that use of the lawyer's traditional method--case and opinion
examination-is more appropriate here. 8 Each Justice's composite
should tell us not only something about the individual Justice's views,
but also something about the views of key blocs on the Court. By
such an effort, we learn more about the range of the possible in urging doctrinal changes and about the nature of the Supreme Court as
an institution.
The plan is first to consider those Justices who stake out positions on the polar "extremes" and then to discuss the remaining members. Therefore, Justices Brennan and Marshall at one end, and Jusing the Poor Through the FourteenthAmendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969) (principle
of minimum welfare within equal protection clause). There is said to be an absence of
such an identifiable principle in at least substantive due process as well. See Moore v.
City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 544 (1977) (White, J., dissenting).
4. The formal opinions of the Supreme Court are deemed significant, but it is
recognized that they may not always reflect the actual views of each Justice. The majority opinion has been likened to a policy instrument hammered out by compromise. See,
e.g., Levy, Book Review, N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1970 § 7, at 30, quoting Justice Jackson:

"When you're writing for the Court, you try to bring your view within the limits of the
views of all those who are supporting you." Hence, the Court opinion at times may
represent more a reflection of the Chief Justice's assignment policy rather than be an
indicator of the intensity with which the opinion writer is wedded to the ideas expressed. See, e.g., Haines, Rolling Back the Top on ChiefJustice Burger's Opinion Assignment Desk, 38 U. PiTT. L. REV. 631 (1977). The dissenting opinion may tend to exaggerate. See, e.g., Burger, W.: When Justices are in dissent "they sometimes overstate
their case," quoted in N.Y. Times, Apr. 9, 1976, § 1, at 51, col. 6.
5. The patterns are important although particular silent concurrences, of course,
may conceal substantial differences with the opinion-writers.
6. The Burger Court views in criminal cases have been treated elsewhere, generally from a collective perspective. See, e.g., LEVY, supra note 1; Chase, The Burger
Court, The Individual, and the Criminal Process: Directions and Misdirections, 52
N.Y.U.L. REV. 518 (1977). The author believes a focus upon the noncriminal case area
provides both a sufficient and a coherent body of materials by which to shed additional
light on Supreme Court process.
7. See, e.g., G. SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL MIND REVISITED-PSYCHOMETRIC
ANALYSIS OF SUPREME COURT IDEOLOGY (1974); J. SPRAGUE, VOTING PATTERNS OF
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT-CASES IN FEDERALISM, 1889-1959 (1968);
Flango, Wenner & Wenner, Concept of Judicial Role: A Methodological Note, 19 AM. J.
POL. Sci. 277 (1975).
8. The conclusions reached in this traditional examination could serve as hypotheses, however, in a subsequent quantitative consideration of the respective voting
records.

THE
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tice Rehnquist at the other, are dealt with in that order. The first two
Justices interpret their roles broadly to justify intervention in support
of aggrieved claimants-and perhaps most particularly racial
minorities and the politically insular. 9 Justice Rehnquist, by contrast,
defers to the other national branches, and to the states.1 0 Next considered is Justice Powell, a major figure. He cautions at times against
undue interference with the other governmental institutions; yet on
other occasions, he fashions new interventionist approaches.' A picture of the Chief Justice follows. Ideologically closest to Rehnquist,
Chief Justice Burger plays a dual role in the life of the court. His
function as titular head of both the Court and the federal judiciary
undoubtedly has an impact upon his perceptions as a Court
member. 12 Justice White is treated next. Closer to the BrennanMarshall end of the spectrum, especially in certain equal protection
contexts, he is nonetheless a "swing" member. He brings to his task a
frank, pragmatic aspect.' 3 Justice Stewart, dealt with after White,
probably is closer philosophically to the views of Rehnquist and
Burger. Yet an effort to accommodate himself to the majority, and in
particular, the employing of narrow bases for decision in troublesome
cases are important components of Stewart's approach. 14 Justice
Blackmun, treated next, emphasizes the Court's responsibility to assure the right to abortion; and, most recently, he has expressed support for affirmative racial admissions programs in universities.' 5 Newcomer John Paul Stevens completes the list. He is ordinarily close to
the Brennan-Marshall wing in equal protection cases, but his opinions
evidence an independent posture in that area as well as in due process contexts. 16
After providing individual assessments, the author concludes that
three Justices in particular-Powell, White, and Stevens-are a key
central force, although by no means a cohesive bloc. 17 Propositions indicating the present collective portrait of the Court are then listed 18
and critically evaluated by the author. 19
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

See notes 20-106 infra and accompanying text.
See notes 107-39 infra and accompanying text.
See notes 139-201 infra and accompanying text.
See notes 202-38 infra and accompanying text.
See notes 239-81 infra and accompanying text.
See notes 282-314 infra and accompanying text.
See notes 315-58 infra and accompanying text.
See notes 359-89 infra and accompanying text.
See notes 395-410 infra and accompanying text.
See notes 411-35 infra and accompanying text.
See notes 436-51 infra and accompanying text.
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I.

THE JUSTICES

JUSTICE BRENNAN
William J. Brennan best typifies the predecessor Warren Court
and its commitment to substantive liberalism; he confidently sees the
Court as a defender of the individual against government, not brooking overly technical access rules or other procedural obstacles to
achieving that goal. 20 He is sharply critical of his colleagues for what
he sees as their too-narrow conception of judicial responsibility and
their watering down of constitutional guarantees. 2 1 He is unwilling to
construe the fourteenth amendment in any narrow, historically confining way, especially since the framers of that provision had "papered
over" 22 their differences. He has urged the strictest scrutiny of classifications impinging upon insular minorities or upon fundamental
23
rights.
Justice Brennan is a judge who does not enjoy the role of "passionate dissenter," 24 but notwithstanding his "instinct for accommodation," 25 he has become one. In an important article written in 1977,26
Brennan made clear his reasons for his frequent dissents and at the
same time expressed his judicial philosophy. He has endorsed the
principle established earlier in Boyd v. United States27 that "constitutional provisions for the security of person and property should be
liberally construed." 28 As Brennan contended, "[i]t is the duty of
courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and
against any stealthy encroachments thereon."29 The genius of our
Constitution, he said, "resides not in any static meaning that it had in
a world that is dead and gone, but in the adaptability of its great
principles to cope with the problems of a developing America." 30 He
added "that there exists . . .the necessity for protecting [the citizen]
20. See G. WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION 341 (1976).
21. See notes 26-31 infra and accompanying text.
22. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 272 (1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting in part)
(federal statute mandating eighteen-year-old vote in state elections held unconstitutional).
23. See notes 38-52 infra and accompanying text.
24. Lewis, N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1976, § 1, at 29, col. 1.
25. Id. (statement attributed to unidentified former Brennan law clerk).
26. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977).
27. 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (subpoena duces tecum to produce papers is an unreasonable search under the fourth amendment if it produces self-incrimination).
28. Id. at 635, quoted in Brennan, supra note 26, at 494.
29. Id.
30. Brennan, supra note 26, at 495.
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fiom arbitrary actions by [state] governments more powerful and
more pervasive than any in our ancestors' time." 31
Brennan sees in recent decisions by the Court a trend "at least
[to] suspend for the time being, the enforcement of the Boyd principle [in due process and equal protection cases]." 32 The Court's new
jurisdiction and standing rules, to him, evidence that regrettable development. He charges that "[u]nder the banner of the vague, undefined notions of equity, comity, and federalism, the Court has condoned both isolated and systematic violations of civil liberties." 3 3 The
Court's actions, he has said, hurt the very groups "most in need of
judicial protection of their rights-the poor, the underprivileged, the
deprived minorities;" 34 standing has been denied absent showings
probably impossible to make. Indeed, he went further in Warth v.
Seldin, 35 a leading exclusionary zoning case, accusing his brethren of
an "indefensible determination by the Court to close the doors of the
federal courts to claims of this kind." 36 Given that trend, Justice
Brennan issued a clarion call to the state courts. It is their right-free
from his Court's review-and indeed, it is their duty to read their
own state constitutions expansively. 3 7 The Supreme Court's recent
prudential decisions, in effect, have placed that trust in the states'
hands.
The present Court majority finds unsatisfactory the Warren
Court's approach to equal protection cases, and Justice Brennan has
had to accommodate himself to the Tribunal's new directions. He had
played an important part in developing the more stringent test, strict
scrutiny, to be applied to an open-ended list of classifications deemed
suspect or adversely affecting fundamental rights. Thus he had spoken
for the Court in the landmark case of Shapiro v. Thompson, 38 announcing that the government could not infringe upon a fundamental
right of interstate travel without demonstrating a compelling government interest and no narrower alternative means. The traditional rational basis standard, applied to all other social and economic legisla31. Id.
32. Id. "It may not be wide of the mark, however, to suppose that these state
courts discern, and disagree with [such a trend]." Id.
33, Id. at 502.
34. Id. at 498.
35. 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (minority, low-income residents of adjoining urban area,
taxpayer groups and prospective builders denied standing to challenge town's restrictions upon construction of multiple dwellings).
36. Id. at 528 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
37. Brennan, supra note 26, at 503.
38. 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (one-year residence requirement for welfare recipients
struck down).
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tion challenged as violative of the clause, is much more deferential; it
requires only that there be some conceivable rational state interest to
pass constitutional muster. The experience has been that categories
determined to be subject to strict scrutiny invariably have been
struck down; those tested by a rational basis standard almost always
have been sustained.
Finding the two-tier equal protection standard (the use of both a
strict scrutiny test and rational basis approach depending on the
category protected) unsound and result-oriented, the Court has
sought to put limits on the categories subject to the strict scrutiny
test.3 9 It has also sought to employ closer scrutiny than that
employed under the rational basis approach, at least in certain settings. Thus it has invoked an intermediate standard in cases testing
classifications based upon gender, 40 based upon illegitimacy, 4 ' or in42
truding upon family relations.
Brennan's pattern of accommodation to that trend is seen most
vividly in gender cases. Initially, in a plurality opinion, he had taken
the position that gender classifications, however "rationalized by an at-

titude of 'romantic paternalism' " should be deemed suspect and thus
tested by the more stringent standard. 4 3 He emphasized that special
disabilities by reason of an immutable characteristic violate "the
basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility." 44 Most recently, in the gender
case of Craig v. Boren,4 5 Justice Brennan spoke for the Court and
39.

Thus poverty is not considered a suspect category. See San Antonio Ind.

School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (Texas funding scheme upheld despite
wide per pupil spending disparity from district to district-education also not found to
be a fundamental right). Nor is gender. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (state
law found void which permitted 18 to 20-year-old females but not males to purchase 3.2
beer). Housing has not been found to be a fundamental right. See Lindsey v. Normet,
405 U.S., 56, 74, (1972) (state law requiring tenants to post double bond in order to appeal from landlord-tenant action violative of equal protection clause). But the Court has
held that prisoners have a fundamental right to have some access to the courts. See
Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977) (right at least to adequate library materials).
40. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
41. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (law forbidding illegitimates to inherit
from their natural fathers while allowing inheritance from natural mothers found to violate equal protection clause).
42. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (ordinance preventing
grandmother from having her two sons' children live with her found to violate due
process clause).
43. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684-86 (1973) (federal statute requiring
only females to demonstrate that spouse is dependent in order to get increased armed
service benefits found to violate fifth amendment due process).
44. Id. at 686, citing Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972).
45. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
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invoked a new middle-range standard. He noted that previous cases
had established that "It]o withstand constitutional challenge [gender
classifications] must serve important governmental objectives and
' 46
must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives."
Hence, gender classifications which were based on an important governmental need were subject to constitutional attack.
Court members still endorse the view that distinctions based
upon race are suspect, but they increasingly disagree about the scope
of their protective role. Justice Brennan earlier wrote the Court opin47
ions in two significant busing cases. Green v. County School Board
marked the turning point. In that case, the Court imposed affirmative

obligations upon local school officials, holding that thereafter, they
had a "duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to
a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated
root and branch." 48 Five years later in Keyes v. School District,49 the
Court held that once there was a showing of segregative intent for a

substantial part of a school district, a rebuttable presumption arose
that such an intent existed for the entire district.
Justice Brennan now finds himself in the minority, objecting to
what he deems a retreat by his colleagues. He has objected to Court
decisions which appear to signal a withdrawal from endorsement of
busing as a remedy for racial segregation. 50 Indeed, he challenges the
46. Id. at 197. See Justice Brennan's Bakke dissent where he called for employment of that intermediate test, rather than the more stringent standard, when, as in the
California university admissions program, the racial classifications were to further
remedial purposes, and did not have the effect of stigmatizing students. Regents of the
Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 98 S. Ct. 2733, 2782-85 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
47. 391 U.S. 430 (1968) (board plan authorizing busing only where local authorities
so choose, given the obligation to end dual racial school systems in rural county, found
to be realistic).
48. Id. at 437-38.
49. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
50. See School Dist. of Omaha v. United States, 433 U.S. 677, 669 (1977) (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (vacate Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals busing order and remand to ascertain extent of purposive discrimination); Austin Ind. School Dist. v. United States,
429 U.S. 990 (1976) (mem.) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (vacate Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals busing order for same reason); Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S.
424, 441 (1976) (Court struck out that part of judge's order mandating permanent racial
balance in a system found to have been a dual one. The district judge had imposed in
an earlier case the rule that there be no majority of a minority within a school; and that objective had been achieved during the first year, but not thereafter as a result of residential
pattern changes. The precedent may be read narrowly as denying district judge's authority to impose racial balance for his lifetime in a school system once found to be segregated; or broadly, as Justices Marshall and Brennan fear, to limit the district judge's
authority, although the majority concedes that perhaps total desegregation had not
yet been accomplished) (Brennan, J., joining in the dissenting opinion of Marshall, J.).
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effort to minimize the constitutional significance of a showing that
particular governmental action has had a disproportionately adverse
effect upon a racial minority. 5 1 Not only does he read the federal judiciary's responsibilities here expansively, but he believes that wide
authority is vested in national political institutions as well. 52
Brennan's conception of a broad judicial role to protect deprived
minorities is evident in his dissent in Regents of University of
California v. Bakke.53 At issue was whether the special admissions
program used by the state medical school that set aside a fixed percentage of openings for racial minorities was legal. The Justice, speaking for himself and three colleagues, maintained that it was, and found
that the program violated neither Title VI54 nor the fourteenth
amendment.

Justice Brennan cautioned the other five members of the Court
to understand the central reality within which constitutional interpre-

tation should take place: Substantial, chronic underrepresentation of
racial minorities in the professions, caused by societal discrimination,
can be addressed successfully only by race-conscious affirmative action by government. 55 Hence he argued that the ideal of "color
51.

See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 256 (1976) (federal civil service exami-

nation upheld although black applicants for the District of Columbia police department
had a disproportionately higher failure rate, especially given circumstances that precluded any inference of purposive discrimination) (Brennan, J., dissenting upon statutory grounds).
52. See United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 168 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring) (Brennan emphasizes authority of United States Attorney General under Federal Voting Rights Act, where Justices voted to uphold a state redistricting plan passed
pursuant to that official's guidelines. The plan employed racial percentages in order to
assure that blacks, deemed the victims of prior discrimination, would have majorities in
several legislative districts); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (Court per
Brennan, J., upholds congressional authority under the fourteenth amendment to ban
English literacy tests, essentially for Puerto Ricans. It is sufficient that the Court perceives "a basis" upon which Congress could have viewed the state requirement as an
invidious discrimination).
53. 98 S.Ct. 2733, 2766 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
54. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970) [hereinafter cited as Title VI] ("No person in the
United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."). Justice Brennan stated that
the intent of the special program was to give considerable flexibility despite the cryptic
nature of the language used. He cited the 1977 federal public works statute providing a
10 percent setoff of contracts to be let to minority employers as evidencing a continuing
congressional commitment to minority race preference. 98 S.Ct. at 2778; see 42 U.S.C. §
6705f(2) (1970).
55. 98 S.Ct. at 2787. Justice Brennan noted that the University of California Regents were an authoritative policy-making body under the state constitution. Accordingly, he argued the cases cited by Justice Powell could not be distinguished.
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blindness [by government must not] become myopia which masks the
reality." 56 Accordingly, in view of the mandate of equality in the fourteenth amendment, Brennan argued that such voluntary state minority admissions programs must not be foreclosed; 57 nor does Supreme
Court case law call for a different result.
Examining the record in the case, Brennan concluded that the
Davis program being challenged did not sweep too broadly. "Only
[those] minority applicants likely to have been isolated from the
mainstream of American life"58 were to be considered. Furthermore,
no meaningful distinction could be drawn between the Davis approach and programs followed in other universities which awarded an
additional set number of points because of the minority status of an
applicant. 59
Justice Brennan's opinion gave little weight to any injury suffered
by Bakke. Admittedly, Bakke had been denied admission while possessing higher objective credentials 60 than the minority candidates accepted into the medical school under the program. Nonetheless,
Brennan found that the university, in denying Bakke admission, had
not intended to stigmatize him nor was there such an effect.6 1
Moreover, as a white, Bakke was not a member of an insular or historically oppressed racial minority. Therefore, Brennan concluded
that strict scrutiny of the remedial program was not appropriate; instead, invoking an intermediate test, Justice Brennan satisfied himself
that the remedial goal was an important one and that the program
62
was substantially related to its achievement.
Justice Brennan further suggested that it was not actually the
special admissions program that caused injury to Bakke; rather the
university's policy only served to remedy the pattern of racial discrimination. Had there been no such societal discrimination in the
first place-and thus no need for a special program-Bakke likely still
would have been refused admission. He thus declared that "there is a
reasonable likelihood that, but for pervasive racial discrimination, respondent would have failed to qualify for admission even in the ab56. Id. at 2768.
57. Id. at 2788.
58. Id. at 2793.
59. Id. at 2794.
60. See Justice Powell's discussion of Bakke's credentials. Id. at 2740-42. Interestingly, Bakke, in applying for admission in the class entering in the fall of 1974 had
higher credentials than the average of those Caucasians admitted but did poorly on the
interview score. Id.
61. Id. at 2792.
62. Id. at 2782-83. He also referred to the intermediate test as "strict and searching." Id. at 2785.
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sence of Davis' special admissions program." 63 That would be the
case, according to Brennan, because there then would have been
enough minority candidates with higher credentials admitted before
him.
Justice Brennan noted that given Powell's swing position, a
five-member majority had expressed support for affirmative action
programs in general. But he expressed concern that a majority could
not be mustered to uphold the particular program being challenged.
As we have seen, Brennan has objected to other recent trends in equal
protection cases. Moreover, he has voiced similar misgivings in a
range of due process contexts. 6 4 Hence Brennan posits that the Court's
narrow construction of the concepts of liberty and property-deemed
protected unless due process is afforded-vitiates constitutional guarantees.
Of course, when the setting shifts to economic policy outside a
fourteenth amendment context, pitting Congress against the states,
Brennan has taken the opposite tack. In National League of Cities v.
Usery,6 5 for example, the Court struck down a federal minimum wage
law as applied to state government employees. Here, Brennan was
critical of the Court's activism in support of state power, seeing the
Tribunal's approach as a "patent usurpation of the role reserved for
66
the political process."
In confronting fourteenth amendment challenges, however, Justice Brennan believes that the Supreme Court must act with vigor. In
his mind, court members must take special care to grasp the essential
nature of the problems that confront not only the Tribunal but the
nation. Justice Brennan sees a need for meaningful access rules and
liberal constitutional construction to assure protection and redress to
63.
64.

Id. at 2787.
In Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 506 (1977) (Brennan, J.,

concurring), Brennan cautioned his colleagues not to endorse legislation which embodied "white suburbia's preference for family living"; he deemed the Connecticut law
denying medical benefits for abortion while granting expenses for childbirth "coer[eive]." Id. at 508. In Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 482 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting),
Brennan dissented from the Court's decision to deny federal relief to an individual defamed by a police circular. Such misgivings are further indicated in Paul v. Davis, 424
U.S. 693, 714 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting), where he states, "[Bly mere fiat, [the
Court] wholly excludes personal interest in reputation from the ambit of 'life, liberty, or
property'" protected by due process. Id. at 721. See also Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S.
651, 683 (1977) (Brennan, J., joining in dissent of White, J.); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422
U.S. 749, 786 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
65. 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (no congressional power, even plenary commerce power,
to apply federal minimum wage law to state and local government employee salaries in
traditional governmental areas in order to protect states).
66. Id. at 858 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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the injured; he believes that such an approach will enhance judicial
integrity and benefit the citizenry.
JUSTICE MARSHALL

Thurgood Marshall fully shares the concerns of Brennan, and he
charts an equally expansive judicial role to safeguard certain individual rights. He is determined that the Supreme Court, along with
the other federal tribunals, must protect insular minorities as well as
the ordinary citizen against arbitrary government action.67 To that
end, he calls upon his colleagues to employ a deliberative range of
standards by which to evaluate legislative classifications, and not simply a deferential rational basis test.68 Justice Marshall thus sees the
common endeavor of judge and lawyer as "nothing less than doing
justice," 69 and he argues that the "Courts have a special responsibility
to preserve and enforce the moral pillars on -which society is built."70
The other members of the Court have joined with Marshall in
recognizing a fundamental right of prisoners to have access to the
courts; 71 however, those members generally have resisted Marshall's

expansive view of suspect categories 72 and fundamental rights. 73
Troubled by his colleagues' limited reading, Marshall rejects the use
of any single standard to measure the rationality of legislation not
deemed to involve the two areas. He believes that such an approach,
which he considers rudderless, undercuts the judicial function;
it provides little guidance either to the judge or to the government
official. Instead, Marshall argues that the Court should invoke a
"spectrum of standards." 74 Consistent application of that approach
would furnish the best opportunity for open and fruitful debate
among the Court members, focusing upon such relevant factors as the
67. See notes 76-106 infra and accompanying text.
68. See notes 71-106 infra and accompanying text.
69. Marshall, Remarks of the Hon. Thurgood Marshall, 29 RECORD (Bar of City of
New York) 15, 15 (1974).
70. Marshall, Conference on World Peace through Law 1973, N.Y. Times, Sept. 21,
1973, at 8, col. 2 quoted in Mason, The Burger Court, 47 N.Y. STATE BAR J. 87, 126
(1975).
71. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
72. See, e.g., James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 143 (1971) (Court upholds state constitutional provision requiring local referendum only in cases of publicly assisted lowrent housing. Justice Marshall finds poverty classification here a suspect category. Id. at
144-45.) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
73. See, e.g., San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). Justice
Marshall would have found a fundamental right to public education since such "[e]ducation directly affects the ability of [the] child to exercise his First Amendment rights."
Id. at 112 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 98.
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character of the classification, the relative importance of the government benefit being denied, and the alleged state interest;7 5 as a result, Marshall believes a sliding scale of standards offers the fullest
measure of constitutionally mandated protection to the individual.
Consistent with his analysis of fourteenth amendment case law is
Marshall's empathy with the poor, racial minorities, and other polgroups. He perceives them not as faceless
itically 7disadvantaged
"masks"- 6 of the law from whom the judge should keep his intellectual distance, but as flesh and blood people, entitled to doctrinal
frameworks which assure that justice will be meted out to them.
Marshall's opinions provide ample evidence of that dual aspect-an intellectual vigor in urging a spectrum of standards as well
as an extreme sensitivity for persons injured by arbitrary governmental action. Consider his expressed views in five important cases. In
the abortion funding case, Maher v. Roe, 7 7 Marshall could find no
constitutional basis for upholding a state's denial of abortion benefits
to an indigent in the face of a fundamental procreative right of privacy. 7 8 That such legislation should be sustained "points up once
again the need for this Court to repudiate its outdated and intellectually disingenuous 'two-tier' equal protection analysis."' 79 He declared
that the government action "brutally coerce[d] poor women to bear
"80
children whom society will scorn for every day of their lives . ..
Marshall argued that not only would the effect "fall with great disparity upon women of minority races," 8 1 but the decision would invite
legislatures, under lobbying pressures, to approve "more such restrictions." 82 Earlier, in Milliken v. Bradley,83 the Court declined to support a district judge's inter-district school consolidation remedy. Justice Marshall, in dissent, found sufficient evidence in the record to
uphold the district judge's remedy and cautioned his brethren not to
abdicate their responsibilities by simply reflecting a "perceived public
mood that we have gone far enough in enforcing the Constitution's
guarantee of equal justice." 84 In Dandridge v. Williams, 85 the Court
75. Id. at 98-99.
76. See J. NOONAN, PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW (1975).
77.

432 U.S. 464 (1977).

78. See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (state laws prohibiting abortion
deny fundamental right of procreative privacy, at least during the first two trimesters, in
violation of fourteenth amendment due process).
79. Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 457 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 456.
81. Id. at 459.
82. Id. at 462.
83. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
84. Id. at 814.
85. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).

HeinOnline -- 14 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1109 1978

1110

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14

sustained a state law imposing an upper limit on the amount that a
family could receive on an Aid to Families with Dependent Children
grant. Marshall noted the "extremes to which the Court has gone in
dreaming up rational bases" 86 for business regulations. But he also
noted that the classification at issue was far different, involving the
"literally vital interests of a powerless minority-poor families without
bread-winners." 8 7 To Marshall, the legislation could not withstand
close examination because it did not assure protection to all needy
dependent children. Moreover, it was clear that the actual reasons for
the regulation were budgetary, that is, "to limit the total cost of the
program along the path of least resistance." 8 8 In Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 89 the Court found no state action requiring a due
process hearing in the decision of an electrical utility to shut off an
individual's electricity. According to Justice Marshall in his dissent,
this was not an instance in which a public utility should be permitted
to be free of constitutional restrictions out of a concern to have a
flourishing private sector; such values in "pluralism and diversity are
simply not relevant when the private company is the only electric
company in town." 90 Finally, in Wyman v. James,9 1 the Court sustained the right of a caseworker to make home visitations upon several days' notice as a reasonable condition for continued welfare payments. Marshall bristled at the analogy that his colleagues drew between such an entry and the obligation of the taxpayer to document
his right to a tax deduction. As he argued, if an IRS agent actually
"invade[d] the home for the purpose of questioning the occupants and
looking for evidence . . .the cries of constitutional outrage would be

unanimous. "92
Justice Marshall's recent dissent in Bakke 9 3 is further evidence of
his extreme sensitivity for individuals injured by arbitrary government action. In Bakke, he expressed deep personal concerns about
the "tragic" 9 4 lot of blacks today. "[D]ragged to this country in
chains," 95 blacks suffer the "inevitable consequence of centuries of
86. Id. at 520 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 529.
89. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
90. Id. at 372-73.
91. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
92. Id. at 343 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
93. Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakzke, 98 S. Ct. 2733, 2798 (1978) (Marshall,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
94. Id. at 2802. Marshall expressed the same sentiments in open court the day the
decision was announced. "'The position of the Negro today in America is tragic ....I
am talking about today."' TIME, July 10, 1978, at 11.
95. 98 S. Ct. at 2798.

HeinOnline -- 14 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1110 1978

VIEWS OF THE NINE JUSTICES

1978]

1111

unequal treatment. " 96 Improving their position should be a "state interest of the highest order. To fail to do so is to ensure that America
97
will forever remain a divided society."
Justice Marshall felt that the obligation of the Supreme Court in
Bakke was clear-to uphold affirmative action programs such as the
program instituted at Davis. In his view, such a university admissions
policy was fully consistent with the fourteenth amendment; indeed,
the central purpose of the framers of that provision was to protect the
new freedman, 98 and the need for that protection has not diminished.
As for race-conscious preferences in favor of minorities, they were
constitutionally mandated. The "experience of Negroes," he said, "has
been different in kind [and therefore they require] greater protection
...to remedy the effects of past discrimination. -99
Justice Marshall despaired that a majority of his colleagues could
not understand the nature of the constitutional commitment owing to
blacks. It was "more than a little ironic," he declared, "that after
several hundred years of class-based discrimination against Negroes,
the Court is unwilling to hold that a class-based remedy . . . is permissible."'10 0 He was apprehensive that the decision might help to
topple countless federal, state, and local affirmative action programs.
As the Court in an earlier day had "destroyed the movement toward
complete equality," he feared that "we have come full circle ...
[N]ow we have the Court again stepping in ..... 101
Justice Marshall sees the Court as the guardian not only of racial
minorities, but also of the disadvantaged and the poor. He views the
Court as the protector of everyman against the arbitrary actions of an
all-powerful government. He has sounded that theme in a number of
public employment cases. In Board of Regents v. Roth, 102 Marshall

96.

Id. at 2802.

97. Id. at 2803.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 2804. Marshall also noted that
[while in] U[nited] J[ewish] O[rganizations]and Webster the use of the disfavored classification was predicated on legislative or administrative action .... in
neither case [did] those bodies [make] findings that there had been constitutional violations or that the specific individuals to be benefited had actually
been the victims of discrimination. .

.

. There is .

. ample support for the

conclusion that a university can employ race-conscious measures to remedy past
societal discrimination, without the need for a finding that those benefited were
actual victims of that discrimination.
Id. at 2804-05.
100. Id. at 2805.
101. Id. at 2806.
102. 408 U.S. 574 (1972) (nontenured teacher whose contract was not renewed,
without any aspersions upon his character or fitness, held to have no entitlement to
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would have afforded a due process hearing to a state college teacher
whose contract was not renewed. "[E]very citizen who applies for a
government job," he said, "is entitled to it unless the government can
establish some reason for denying the employment. This is the 'property' right

. . .

10 3
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment."

Finally in other cases, he has displayed concern about the dire
consequences facing a fired employee, 10 4 has emphasized the important "liberty" interest implicated by police hair style regulations, 10 5
and has subjected employment classifications grounded upon age to
close scrutiny. 106 In sum, Justice Marshall searches for the key ingredients of a challenged government regulation, with a deeply felt
commitment to his fellow man as a driving force.
JUSTICE REHNQUIST

William Rehnquist sees his judicial responsibilities quite differently. Justices Brennan and Marshall have sought to extend the
Court's scrutiny of official action alleged to have impinged upon civil
liberties, and have thus endorsed generous access rules. 10 7 Justice
Rehnquist, on the other hand, almost without exception has voted to
uphold challenged government regulations and to limit federal court
jurisdiction. He calls for constitutional construction in which judicial
interpretations are clearly grounded in the language of the document.
Thus, he takes the position that it is for the political branches, not for
the Supreme Court, to decide issues of major national policy. 10 8 Furfuture employment; thus, teacher had no due process right to a hearing and no right to
discover the reasons for discharge).
103. Id. at 588 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
104. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974) (Court upheld discharge of federal
non-probationary civil servant for "such -cause as will promote the efficiency" of the
service). To Marshall, the individual was "driven to the brink of financial ruin" while
he waited for reinstatement, since he had not been afforded a prior hearing right. Id.at
220-21 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
105. Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976) (Court upheld police hair style regulations as not violating a liberty interest; such regulations will therefore be upheld absent
a showing that they lack a rational basis). Marshall disagreed, and in his dissent stated,
"[t]o say that the liberty guarantee .. .does not encompass matters of personal appearance would be fundamentally inconsistent with the values of privacy, self-identity, autonomy, and personal integrity that I have always assumed the Constitution was designed to protect." Id. at 251.
106. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (Court sustains law requiring state police officers to retire at age fifty). Determining that the aged
were a class "subject to repeated and arbitrary discrimination in employment," id. at
324 (Marshall, J., dissenting), Marshall would have required the government to establish
a "reasonably substantial interest and a scheme reasonably closely tailored to achieving
that interest." Id. at 325.
107. See notes 20-52 supra and accompanying text.
108. See notes 112-18 infra and accompanying text.
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thermore, the states must remain independent units of government
in order to perform their constitutional functions.
In 1974, he observed that there had been a "dramatic shift of
power.
to the judicial branch .... The federal courts . ..are no
longer simply dispute settlers .. performing constitutional adjudication primarily as a bi-product .... 1o9 While he has claimed neither
"to lament nor applaud" that approach, 110 his pattern of expression
makes clear that it is a lament. In a recent study of his votes, his actions were deemed to be motivated by three attitudes: "(1) Conflicts
between an individual and the government should, whenever possible, be resolved against the individual; (2) Conflicts between state
and federal authority . . . should, whenever possible, be resolved in
favor of the states; and (3) Questions of the exercise of federal jurisdiction . . . should, whenever possible, be resolved against such exercise." 1 1 ' Justice Rehnquist is critical of what he deems to be judicial lawmaking. As did Holmes," 2 he sees our Constitution as a living
instrument, 113 which must adapt to changing social and technological
conditions; but he warns against accepting a version of the living
Constitution concept that finds an affirmative judicial obligation to act
because "other branches of government have failed [to act]," ' 11 4 or
that sees the Court as "the voice and conscience of contemporary
society." 115 To Rehnquist, the idea of the Tribunal as akin to a "roving commission to second-guess" 1 16 the political institutions is contrary to the framers' intent and in violation of the principle of democratic governance. He contrasts the broader role" 17 of Congress, as
contemplated by the framers of the fourteenth amendment, with the
role intended for the judiciary, and argues that unless values are
traceable to constitutional language and history, Court opinions are
8
merely exercises in subjectivism.11
Justice Rehnquist recognizes that the equal protection clause is
ambiguous; indeed, he views it as a paradox 1 9 which lacks any direct-

109. Rehnquist, Whither the Courts, 60 A.B.A.J. 787, 788 (1974).
110. Id.
111. Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90 HARV. L. REV. 293,
294 (1976).
112. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920).
113. See Rehnquist, Observation: The Notion of a Living Constitution,54 TEx. L.
REV. 693, 693 (1976).

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at 695.
Id.
Id. at 698.
Id. at 699-700.
Id. at 704.
Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 779 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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ing principle. 120 But he believes that the Justices should not compound such difficulties by choosing only those societal groups that12a1
majority deem insular and thus deserving of "ward of the Court"'
protection against the legislature. Nor in Rehnquist's mind should the
Court employ intermediate approaches which require the most subjective assessments regarding the importance of legislative goals or
the substantiality of the classifications chosen to achieve them.' 2 2 To
him, the test which takes appropriate account of the Court's limited
role is the traditional rational basis test. Consequently, in other than
race relations contexts, he would ask whether a challenged classifica23
tion has a conceivable rational basis. 1
In the area of race, Justice Rehnquist feels that the Court's mandate is to apply strict scrutiny. At the same time, Rehnquist denies
that sweeping busing orders in school desegregation cases are part of
that judicial responsibility. 1 24 His opposition to such orders is thus
consistent with both his concept of the federal judiciary's limited role
and his confidence that state officials are carrying out their tasks in
good faith. Furthermore, Rehnquist believes that desegregation calls
for neutral assignment, not coerced "racial mixing." 1 5 Justice Rehnquist's Court opinion in Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler 126 signaled a new willingness by the majority to restrict both the
busing remedy and the authority of the federal district judge, regardless whether total achievement of a unitary system actually had yet
12
taken place. 7
128
Justice Rehnquist joined Justice Stevens' opinion in Bakke,
finding that the university's special admissions policy for minorities
violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.129 Justice Rehn120. See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
121.

Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 657 (1973) (Court strikes down per se

state prohibition of alien employment in civil service as violating equal protection)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
122. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 221 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("How is
this Court to divine what objectives are important? How is it to determine whether a
particular law is 'substantially' related . . . ? [E]ven if we manage to avoid both confusion and the mirroring of our own preferences . . . the thousands of judges in other
courts who must interpret the... Clause may not be so fortunate.").
123. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 658 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
124. See Austin Ind. School Dist. v. United States, 429 U.S. 990 (1976) (mem.)
(Justice Rehnquist joins in Justice Powell's concurrence that only rarely would busing
of elementary school children in urban areas be justified).
125. Keyes v. School Dist., 413 U.S. 189, 258 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
126. 427 U.S. 424 (1976).
127. Id. at 436.
128. Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 98 S. Ct. 2733, 2809 (1978) (Stevens,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
129. Id. at 2815.
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quist's concurrence in Bakke probably should not be viewed as an
instance of his support of an individual's claim against government;
rather, it is best understood as his deference toward a federal legislative policy deemed valid and controlling as against an inconsistent
policy of a single state university campus.
So understood, his concurrence in Bakke is consistent with his
general deferential approach. He has followed that approach not only
in equal protection cases but also in due process contexts. Thus he
spoke for the Court in finding that reputation, absent "some more
tangible interests such as employment," was neither liberty nor property within the purview of the due process clause.130 Accordingly, the
Court held that an individual defamed by the police had no federal
remedy for damages under the civil rights statute.131
Even where there is a property interest under state law, Justice
Rehnquist believes it may be restricted by procedures prescribed in
the granting statute. 132 Moreover, his opinion for the Court in We inberger v. Salfi, 13 3 may have sounded the death knell of the irrebuttable presumption doctrine. Invoking that doctrine, the Court
previously had struck down legislation that the members believed
improperly had foreclosed litigation on issues when application of the
law to the plaintiff in question clearly was arbitrary. 134 Justice Rehnquist argued that all classifications necessarily involve such presumptions. 13 5 Consequently he argued that to strike down such laws
because in some instances application is unreasonable is to challenge
the idea of lawmaking itself;1 36 so long as such legislation had a conceivable rational basis, it should pass constitutional muster. 137 Rehnquist would apply that deferential standard to abortion situations,
138
but his views in that area have not carried a majority.
130.

Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976).

131. Id. at 713-14.
132. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 152 (1974).
133. 422 U.S. 749 (1975) (Court per Justice Rehnquist upholds nine-month marriage duration requirement for spouse to receive social security benefits as not violating

due process; the Court found no constitutionally protected status in a noncontractual
claim on public treasury). But see Turner v. Department of Employment Security, 423
U.S. 44 (1975) (per curiam).
134. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (board requirement
that pregnant teacher four or five months pregnant take an unpaid leave found to create
a conclusive presumption of incompetency during pregnancy and thus to violate due
process); Vlandis v. Klein, 412 U.S. 441 (1973) (state imposition of higher tuition on
individual, given nonresidence status which under law was not capable of change, is
violation of due process).
135. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 772-73 (1975).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 774.
138. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 173-74 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). He dis-
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Consistently then, Justice Rehnquist has supported governmental
authority when challenged upon a fourteenth amendment basis, applying almost the equivalent of a heavy presumption in its favor. 13 9
JUSTICE POWELL
Lewis Powell is a major figure between the polar extremes of the

Court. Justice Powell's pattern of perceptions is more complex than
that of the Justices previously discussed. That pattern has five components: (1) Standing rules serve fundamental judicial process con-

cerns and therefore should not be viewed as obstacles to carrying out

the Court's mandate; 140 (2) Prudential considerations sometimes will
require the Tribunal to decline jurisdiction although a case or controversy is present;14 1 (3) A Justice has the responsibility to analyze
the articulated justifications for legislation and should weigh the importance of the governmental goal and the substantiality of the individual interest with respect to it; 142 (4) The Court should strive to
assure that political officials have ample leeway in establishing and
implementing social policy; (5) Public officials, including state judges,
should be assumed to be competent and to be acting in good faith
unless cause is shown to reject that assumption. 143

According to a former law clerk, Justice Powell operates in the
tradition of a burkean judge, recognizing the limits within which judicial institutions must operate. 144 Thus, Powell has taken the lead in
approves of the compelling state interest approach which he believes entails passing
upon the "wisdom of [legislative] policies." Id. at 174.
139. His support of state redistricting legislation intentionally assuring black
majorities in some districts to redress former discrimination is part of that pattern. See
United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977). He did vote to strike down the
gender classification in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 655 (1975) (Rehnquist,
J., concurring), deeming the classification to be not in furtherance of the law's demonstrable purpose, to permit a surviving parent to remain at home with a child. In Weinberger, the Court held that a social security payment of benefits to a surviving female
spouse but no such payments to a surviving widower of covered wage earner violated
due process. Notwithstanding Justice Rehnquist's restraintism in the fourteenth amendment cases, he is an activist in protecting state power when it collides with federal
authority. In National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), the Court per
Justice Rehnquist found an implied state immunity, insulating the state from application
of federal minimum wage legislation to state and local governmental employees in traditional areas to protect a state's "attributes of sovereignty." Id. at 845.
140. See note 145 infra and accompanying text.
141. See notes 146-50 infra and accompanying text.
142. See notes 151-56 infra and accompanying text.
143. See notes 157-61, 165-75 infra and accompanying text.
144. Wilkinson, Hon. Lewis F. Powell, Jr.: Five Years on the Supreme Court: Mr.
Justice Powell: An Overview, 11 U. RICH. L. REV. 259 (1977); see Leedes, Mr. Justice
Powell's Standing, 11 U. RICH. L. REv. 269 (1977).
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urging restricted access of citizens to the federal courts. He believes
that a showing of personal injury in fact, not some vague stake in the
outcome or generalized grievance, ordinarily should be required to
meet article III standing requirements. 145 Powell has urged additional
prudential considerations to justify denying access: the interest
claimed by the aggrieved party must not be insubstantial; 14 6 a constitutional challenge on behalf of another should not be allowed unless litigation by the party more immediately aggrieved is in "all practical terms impossible"; 14 7 pronouncement of a precedent that will be
"difficult to cabin" should be avoided by evaluating the effect of a
decision upon the doctrinal development of the Court; 148 the causal
connection between plaintiff's alleged grievance and defendant's conduct must be clear; 14 9 and the federal judiciary's remedial powers
must appear likely to redress the injury. 150
Once these procedural tests are met, Justice Powell urges a
closer examination of the challenged governmental action than would
be endorsed by his more restraintist colleagues. Thus, in cases involving legislative distinctions which appear to "approach sensitive and
fundamental personal rights,"'15 1 he argues for a careful assessment of
ends and means. He asks "[W]hat legitimate state interests does the
classification promote? What fundamental personal rights might the
classification endanger?"' 152 Powell expresses dissatisfaction with the
145. [Ajllowing unrestricted ... citizen standing would significantly alter the
allocation of power .. with a shift away from a democratic form of government
* ..
[Moreover] the allowance of public actions would produce uneven and

sporadic review, the quality of which would be influenced by the resources and
skill of the particular plaintiff ....
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 188, 191 (1973) (federal taxpayers held to
lack standing to challenge CIA statute providing secrecy for CIA appropriations) (Powell, J., concurring).
146. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 129 (1976) (Court held that physician has
standing in abortion case) (Powell, J., dissenting). Powell disagreed finding "nothing
more is at stake than remuneration for professional services." Id.
147. Id. at 126. Thus Powell did not believe it appropriate to have the physician in
Singleton assert the interests of the pregnant women.
148. Id. at 129.
149. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38-39 (1976) (Court
per Justice Powell holds that individuals on welfare lacked standing to challenge new
IRS ruling granting favorable treatment to hospitals despite refusal to give service to
indigents). "[I]t does not follow . .. that the denial of access to hospital services in fact
results from [the Secretary of the Treasury's] new Ruling." Id. at 42.
150. Id. at 38; Austin Ind. School Dist. v. United States, 429 U.S. 990 (1976)
(mem.) (Powell, J., concurring).
151. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 172 (1972) (Court per Justice
Powell held state law denying illegitimate children recovery under workman's compensation for death of natural father violates equal protection).
152. Id. at 173.
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two-tier equal protection standard, "viewed by many as a resultoriented substitute for more critical analysis."' 153 Therefore, while not
comfortable with the thought of yet another intermediate tier, he endorses efforts to employ close scrutiny to classifications grounded
upon gender, 154 those grounded upon illegitimacy, 155 and those
which intrude upon the sanctity of the family. 156 Justice Powell thus
believes that such classifications should neither be subject merely to
the deferential rational basis test, nor be subject to the stringent demands of the strict scrutiny test.
Justice Powell also believes that legislators' motivations are not
beyond the ken of a sitting Justice. For example, when claimants allege that racial discrimination is a real purpose behind government
action which appears neutral on its face, he encourages the Tribunal
to engage in a "sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct
evidence of intent as may be available."' 1 57 Significantly, however,
Justice Powell has been unwilling to take the position that disproportionate racial impact-whether in public schools, 1 58 housing,' 59 or
employment contexts16 0 -should give rise to a presumption of invidious intent. 161 Thus he recognizes that minority plaintiffs have a
difficult evidentiary task, since the burden of going forward is not
shifted to the defendant.
Powell's opinions in race relations cases reflect confidence that he
can develop judicial approaches that speak more meaningfully to the
needs of the present society. The opinions also suggest his caution in
seeking to narrow the busing remedy. Calling for Court doctrine that
is workable for both North and South, Powell has urged abandonment
of the long-time distinction between de jure and de facto segregation. 16 2 Using his approach, plaintiffs would not have to establish
purposive discrimination in the public school context. Simply upon a
153.

Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210-11 n* (1976) (Powell, J., concurring).

154. Id. at 211.
155. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406
U.S. 164 (1972).
156. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
157. Arlington Heights v. Metro Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977)
(Court per Justice Powell upholds as not violative of equal protection the refusal of
village to rezone to permit multiple family dwellings).
158. Austin Ind. School Dist. v. United States, 429 U.S. 990 (1976) (mem.).
159. Arlington Heights v. Metro Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
160. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (Powell, J., joining in majority
opinion).
161. Arlington Heights v. Metro Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977)
(absent "a clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than race").
162. Keyes v. School Dist., 413 U.S. 189, 224 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
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showing of racial imbalance, courts would require school officials to
engage in a range of integrative steps; those steps, however, would
be short of busing.16 3 He has contended that at least in urban settings
in the North only rarely is busing proper since the crucial factor is
64
changing residential patterns, not school board conduct. 1
Powell's opposition to compelling state officials to bus school
children is consistent with another strain in his pattern-a hesitance
to intrude upon general policy making by the political institutions.
Thus, he criticized those Justices who would place gender into the
category of suspect classification "at the very time when State legislatures.., are debating the proposed [Equal Rights] Amendment....
[P]re-empt[ion] [would] . . . not reflect appropriate respect for duly
prescribed legislative processes.' 1 65 Powell evidenced similar judicial
restraint in declining to find a constitutional requirement to fund
abortions. 1 66 He emphasized that "[ain indigent woman who desires
an abortion suffers no disadvantage as a consequence of [the state's]
decision [not to provide the monies]." 16 7 He explained that "[t]he
indigency [itself] . . . is neither created nor . . . affected by the . . .
regulation.' 68 Admittedly, an indigent woman might find it difficult
to get an abortion, absent such funding, and the Court was "not un163. "Public schools are creatures of the State, and whether the segregation is
state-created or state-assisted or merely state-perpetuated should be irrelevant to constitutional principle." Id. at 227. He continued:
I would hold ... that where segregated schools exist within a school district to
a substantial degree, there is a prima facie case that the duly constituted public
authorities . . . are sufficiently responsible to warrant imposing upon them a
nationally applicable burden to demonstrate they nevertheless are operating a
genuinely integrated school system.
Id. at 224.
A system would be integrated in accord with constitutional standards if the
responsible authorities had taken appropriate steps to (i) integrate faculties and
administration; (ii) scrupulously assure equality of facilities, instruction, and
curriculum opportunities throughout the district; (iii) utilize their authority to
draw attendance zones to promote integration; and (iv) locate new schools,
close old ones, and determine the size and grade categories with this same
objective in mind .... An integrated school system does not mean-and indeed
could not mean . . . that every school must in fact be an integrated unit. A
school which happens to be all or predominately white or all or predominately
black is not a "segregated" school in an unconstitutional sense if the system
itself is a genuinely integrated one.
Id. at 226-27. "[Tlhe ambiguities of Swann construed to date almost uniformly in favor
of extensive transportation, should be redefined to restore a more viable balance among
the various interests which are involved." Id. at 252.
164. Austin Ind. School Dist. v. United States, 429 U.S. 990 (1976) (mem.).
165. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 692 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
166. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
167. Id. at 474 (emphasis added).
168. Id.
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sympathetic to [her] plight."'16 9 Yet he underscored the Tribunal's limited function, declaring that such sensitive policy choices should be
made by the legislature. 170 He displayed similar restraint in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriquez171 in sustaining the
Texas school property tax as a basis for educational funding although
it had resulted in widely disparate per-pupil spending from one educational district to another. The Court, he declared, lacked "both the
expertise and familiarity with local problems so necessary to the making of wise decisions. "172 He also cautioned against abrogating "systems of financing public education presently in existence in virtually
every State"17 3 absent a showing that the education provided to a
child clearly fell below an acceptable minimum. Significantly, he
sought to encourage state legislatures to reduce inequities, noting
that the Court was not "placing its judicial imprimatur on the status
1 74
quo. The need is apparent for reform."'
Justice Powell would extend his posture of judicial deference to
elected officials striving to develop major social policy to state judges
on the basis that they, no less than their federal counterparts, should
be presumed to be committed to enforcement of constitutional
norms. 17 5 This judicial deference, although present, is not as clearly
stated in his Bakke 17 6 opinion. The lack of clarity results from the
nature of the case: Conflicting governmental policies were before the
Court-one policy in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, framed
by Congress, and a second developed by a state university medical
school.
Nonetheless, Powell's important opinion in Bakke provides a useful case study of his judicial approach. In that case, his colleagues
split evenly. Four members deemed Title VI clear in proscribing the
university's race-conscious exclusion policy. 1 77 Four others found no
obstacle to the affirmative action program either in Title VI or in the
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Id. at 479.
Id.
411 U.S. 1 (1972).
Id. at 41.
Id. at 44.

174. Id. at 58.
175. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (Court per Justice Powell holds that
while corporal punishment in the public schools requires due process, that guarantee
can be afforded through a subsequent state court common law relief for aberrational
abuse); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (Court per Justice Powell forecloses federal
habeas corpus to test a claim of unconstitutional search "where the State has provided
an opportunity for full and fair litigation." Id. at 482.).
176. Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 98 S.Ct. 2733 (1978).
177. Id. at 2809-15 (Stevens, Burger, Rehnquist, Stewart, JJ., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
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fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause. 17 8 They endorsed the
university's policy as necessary to remedy societal discrimination and
not materially different from more subtle affirmative action programs
179
which take race into account.
Justice Powell walked a middle path. He agreed with one group
that Title VI was not intended to forbid race-conscious programs in
federally assisted facilities. 180 He then concurred in the perception of
the other group that the program in question worked a racial exlusion. 18 1 To him, any such affirmative action prografn, voluntarily instituted without authoritative mandate, violated both the federal statute and the fourteenth amendment. 182 His opinion seemed to mark
off boundaries within which the judiciary is competent. It may be
read as stating several propositions respecting constitutional interpretation and judicial role.
First, the Court should interpret the fourteenth amendment
to state a principle of universal application.1 83 The Tribunal should focus upon the provision's "universal terms," 184 the "broader princi178. Id. at 2766-94 (Brennan, Marshall, White, Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
179. Id.
180. Id. at 2745-47. Title VI proscribes "only those racial classifications that would
violate the Equal Protection Clause or the Fifth Amendment." Id. at 2747. He considers
the legislative intent and legislative history important in determining the meaning of
discrimination. Since the classification here was deemed a violation of the equal protection clause, Congress intended to proscribe it under Title VI as well. Id.
181. Id. at 2747-64.
182. Id. As a result of the four-one-four split, the Court affirmed that part of the
California Supreme Court judgment ordering Bakke's admission and invalidating the
Davis program, and reversed that part which had enjoined the university from taking
race into account as a factor.
Justice Powell does not discuss whether a private cause of action exists under Title
VI, since the university had not raised the issue below. He assumes that it does exist
for the purpose of the present suit. Except for Justice White, who reaches the question
and determines that it does not exist, the other members assume its existence. If raised
properly, the Court would likely find that such a private cause of action exists, given the
Justice Department view and lower court expressions. See Justice Stevens' opinion, id.
at 2809. But see Cannon v. University of Chicago, 559 F.2d 1063 (7th Cir. 1976) (sex
discrimination banned in educational institution receiving federal funds). The Seventh
Circuit found no private cause of action included under Educational Amendments
of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976). The Supreme Court has accepted the case. See 46
U.S.L.W. 3487, 3799 (U.S. June 27, 1978) (No. 77-926).
Once Bakke established the university had discriminated against him on grounds of
race, the burden shifted to the university to demonstrate that he would not have been
admitted even absent the special program. Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 98 S.
Ct. 2733, 2743 (1978). Justice Powell apparently accepts the California Supreme Court
approach of analogizing the case to a Title VII case with regard to burden shifting here.
The university conceded its inability to meet that burden. Id.
183. Id. at 2750.
184. Id.
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ple"'8 15 intended by the framers, and Court case law in the twentieth
century endorsing that broader aspect. The Court thus should not
stress unduly the framers' immediate concern to protect the free86
dom of former slaves.'
Second, the strict scrutiny test, rather than a more deferential
standard, should be invoked notwithstanding any alleged benign purpose. 18 7 Both principle and good sense call for rejection of a more
deferential test, Powell argued. The language of the amendment admits of no "special wards."' 8 8 Nor is there any reasoned basis for
deciding which groups merit "heightened judicial solicitude. "189 The
Court not only lacks competence to rank groups' constitutional protection depending upon their degree of societal injury, but such constitutional preference might prove not so benign to the groups themselves. Preferential programs may reinforce common stereotypes and
there may be inequity in forcing the innocent to bear the burden. 190
Third, Justice Powell believed that the focus must be on protecting the individual; hence a fatal flaw of the university admissions
program in Bakke was its disregard of individual rights. 1 1 "The
guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one thing when applied to
one individual and something else when applied to a person of
another color. If both are not accorded the same protection, then it is
19 2
not equal."'
Fourth, the white candidate's injury was caused by the unconstitutional action of the university. Justice Powell felt that it was
highly questionable to operate on the assumption that the university's
program was not the cause of injury to Allan Bakke. Justice Powell
accused the dissenters of engaging in a "speculative leap" in their
assumption that "but for [societal discrimination] Bakke 'would have
failed to qualify for admission' because Negro applicants . . . would
have made better scores." 193
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 2751.
188. Id. The intermediate standard employed for gender-based distinctions is not
appropriate because such distinctions "are less likely to create the analytical and practical problems present in preferential programs premised on racial or ethnic criteria. With
respect to gender there are only two possible classifications. The incidence of the burdens imposed by preferential classifications is clear." Id. at 2755. "The Fourteenth
Amendment is not directed solely against discrimination due to a 'two-class [blackwhite] theory.'" Id. at 2751.
189. Id. at 2751.
190. Id. at 2753.
191. Id. at 2764.
192. Id. at 2748.
193. Id. at 2751 n.36.

HeinOnline -- 14 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1122 1978

1978]

VIEWS OF THE NINE JUSTICES

1123

Fifth, racial preferences of the exclusionary type employed by
the medical school are legitimate in Justice Powell's view only where
there has been a finding of prior violation of law. The Court should
not approve "a classification that aids persons perceived as members
of relatively victimized groups at the expense of other innocent individuals in the absence of judicial, legislative, or administrative findings of constitutional or statutory violations." 194 Absent such findings
from an authoritative government body1 95 race properly may remain a
factor in considering the application of a candidate for admission, but
may not be used to justify a total "exclu[sion] from a specific
1 96
percentage of the seats in an entering class."
Sixth, the strict scrutiny test, the proper standard to be applied
here, requires that the government establish that its "purpose or intent is both . . . permissible and substantial, [and its chosen classification] 'necessary.' -197 Of the four purposes 19 8 urged by the uni194. Id. at 2757-58. Justice Powell notes that the case does not call into question
authoritative administrative actions such as consent decrees under Title VII or approval
of reapportionment plans under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. He says that in such
cases "there has been detailed legislative consideration of the various indicia of previous constitutional or statutory violations ....
."Id. at 2755 n.41.
195. Id. at 2758-59.
[I]solated segments of our vast governmental structures are not competent to
make those decisions, at least in the absence of legislative mandates and legislatively determined criteria.... Before relying upon these sorts of findings [by
an educational institution] in establishing a racial classification, a governmental
body must have the authority and capability to establish, in the record, that the
classification is responsive to identified discrimination.
Id. at 2758-59. The "broad mission [of the University of California at Davis] is education, not the formulation of any legislative policy or the adjudication of particular claims
of illegality." Id. at 2758.
196. Id. at 2764.
197. Id. at 2757.
198. Four were offered by the university:
(i) " '[R]educing the historic deficit of traditionally disfavored minorities in medical
schools and the medical profession'...." Id. (quoting Petitioner's Brief at 32). Justice
Powell views this goal of "[p]referring members of any one group for no reason other
than race or ethnic origin [as] discrimination for its own sake [and] as facially invalid."
id.
(ii) "[G]ountering the effects of societal discrimination .
Id. Justice Powell
concludes that "[v]ithout. . . findings of constitutional or statutory violations, it cannot
be said that the government has any greater interest in helping one individual than in
refraining from harming another." Id. at 2758.
(iii) "[Increasing the number of physicians who will practice in communities currently underserved ....
."Id. at 2757. Justice Powell concludes that "[p]etitioner simply
has not carried its burden of demonstrating that it must prefer members of particular
ethnic groups over all other individuals in order to promote better health care delivery
to deprived citizens." Id. at 2759.
(iv) "[O]btaining the educational benefits that flow from an ethnically diverse student body." Id. at 2757. Justice Powell suggests a fifth possible purpose-fair appraisal
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versity for the program, only one goal was seen by Powell as
permissible and substantial: the "attainment of a diverse student
body." 199 The university, however, had failed to show that the
exclusionary means selected were necessary to the achievement of
diversity. Indeed, 0the means chosen would tend to hinder achieve20
ment of the goal.
Seventh, once the university eliminates such a racial percentage
system, the Court should refrain from intruding upon the admissions
process even though race is being used as one factor in the evaluation
of applicants. Absent evidence to the contrary, the Court should assume that a university which acts in good faith will be taking race
into account in evaluating applications on an individual basis. The
Court should not presume that "a university, professing to employ a
facially nondiscriminatory admissions policy, would operate it as a
cover for the functional equivalent of a quota system." 2'0 It is likely
that Justice Powell, notwithstanding his opposition to the Davis program, will defer in the future to universities in their efforts to employ
affirmative action without strict racial quotas.
What, in sum, may be concluded about Justice Powell's approach
in fourteenth amendment cases? Judicial process rules play a fundamental part in confining a Justice's discretion. Unlike Justice Rehnquist, he calls for close scrutiny of governmental ends and means, at
times leading him to vote to strike legislation and state policy deemed
violative of the fourteenth amendment. In contrast to Justice Marshall,
an extreme sensitivity to the claims of racial minorities and the politically insular is not part of his pattern. In his analysis he strives to be
dispassionate, keeping himself at some distance from the fray.
CHIEFJUSTICE B URGER
Warren Burger bears a heavier responsibility than his colleagues
on the Court; in addition to being Chief Justice, and therefore
spokesman for the Court, he is also head of the federal judiciary. His
perceptions about the Court, especially as expressed before lay and
governmental audiences with regard to the "crisis" in the federal
courts, 202 inevitably are affected by his dual role. He seeks a more
of an applicant in a way which discounts cultural bias in testing. That purpose was not
urged by the university, nor did the record disclose such bias. Id. at 2757 n.43.
199. Id. at 2760.
200. Id. at 2761.
201. Id. at 2763.
202. E.g., Burger, How to Break the Log-Jam in the Courts, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REPORTS, Dec. 19, 1977, at 21. The Chief Justice supports a substantial increase in the
number of federal judges, expansion of the powers of federal magistrates, elimination of
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deliberative environment for the federal judge and some way to manage the growing docket avalanche. At the same time, Chief Justice

Burger contends that the Court has enlarged significantly constitutional guarantees for all individuals.2 0 3 Undoubtedly, as he confronts
the issues that come before the Supreme Court, he occasionally
weighs how he should vote in order to maintain a leadership position
on the Tribunal. As a sitting member, he has tended to vote with
Justice Rehnquist. His record reveals two major shifts: one in his ex-

pressed attitude toward busing204 and the other in his view on abortion.

20 5

The Chief Justice contends that the federal courts should play
only a limited role in policy making. He is therefore critical of
lawyer-activists who misperceive the courts as channels for broad so-

cial reform. Indeed, those who look to tenured federal judges to "reshape our society" should "ponder what remedy is available if the
20 6
world shaped by the judicial process is not to their liking."
Moreover, he is convinced that it is not within the judges' mandate to
impose their own notions of what is good for the country. 20 Despite
Chief Justice Burger's philosophical predisposition toward judicial re20 8
straint, he accepts the need at times for a more activist posture.
diversity jurisdiction, elimination of three-judge courts, and greater Supreme Court control over its own jurisdiction. If the Supreme Court mandatory jurisdiction caseload cannot be eased, Burger appears to favor the creation of "some kind of intermediate court"
of appeals. Id. See Landever, ChiefJustice Burger and Extra-CaseActivism, 20 J. PUB.
L. 523 (1971); Oelsner, Burger Asks Review of U.S. Sentencing; Decries Disparities,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 2, 1977, at 1, col. 6; Weaver, Burger Sees High Court Case Load
Doubling by 1987 if "Appalling Mass of Litigation" Persists, N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1974,
at 16, col. 1.
203. "[T]o say that the Court has denied access to deprived or disadvantaged
people is refuted by the public record on claims of women, minority groups, prisoners,
aliens, illegitimate children, minors, students, mental patients and welfare recipients."
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORTS, supra note 202, at 21.
204. See notes 215-24 infra and accompanying text.
205. See notes 225-30 infra and accompanying text.
206. Burger: Don't Look For Courts to Reshape Society, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REPORTS, Oct. 4, 1971, at 19; see Graham, BurgerAsserts Reform is Not Role of Courts,
N.Y. Times, July 4, 1971, at 1, col. 5, at 20, col. 1.
207. See Farrell, Burger, Honoring Holmes, Outlines Role of Judges, N.Y. Times,
May 11, 1970, at 9, col. 3.
208.

U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORTS, supra note 202, at 21:

[If a State is running its prisons or its mental hospitals in a way that violates
... civil rights .

.

. it is a judge's duty to act ....

The trend toward what is

called judicial activism ... is partly brought on by a host of new problems ...
and they are becoming more acute ....

[There are] problems ....

[As a result,]

poor draftsmanship [and] gaps [in legislative schemes occur] .... [Jludges have
to fill those gaps ....
[AIll of us should be constantly on guard against going
beyond proper limits on the judicial function, but this is easier said than
applied.
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In the main, Chief Justice Burger has sought to keep the Tribunal's role a narrow one; consequently his opinions reflect an effort to
apply standing rules narrowly. 20 9 He has resisted access rules that, in
his judgment, would have the federal courts play the role of "continu210
ing monitors of the wisdom and soundness of Executive action."
Moreover, he has dissented when he has felt that his colleagues were
not demonstrating due regard for the judgments of state courts. 211
In equal protection and due process litigation, he takes positions
similar to those of Justice Rehnquist. He endorses application of the
rational basis test, rather than the much more subjective intermediate
approach, in assessing classifications arising from social and economic
legislation. 212 He views the irrebuttable presumption doctrine as an
unsuccessful attempt to narrow the Court's intrusion into government
action. As he explains, the doctrine merely "transfer[red] . . . the

elusive and arbitrary 'compelling state interest' concept 213 into due
process, thereby potentially calling into question the "thousands of
state statutes [which] create classifications permanent in duration
which are less than perfect .. ."214
209.

See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 215-17 (1976) (Burger, C.J., dissent-

ing) (sole member of Court taking the position that the liquor seller lacked standing to
assert the equal protection argument of males, 18-20 years old, who could not purchase
3.2 beer); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 217 (1974)
(Burger, C.J., commented that it was mere "speculation whether the claimed nonobservance of . . . [the incompatability clause (art. I, § 6, cl. 2)] deprives citizens of the
faithful discharge of legislative duties" of reservist members of Congress); United States
v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974) (federal taxpayer held not to have standing to challenge federal statute providing that CIA appropriations not be made public); Laird v.
Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972) (citizen members of political organizations bringing class action denied standing to challenge army monitoring of legitimate political activity of
civilians on rationale that because injuries were too speculative, there was no showing
of injuries to plaintiffs themselves).
210. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 15 (1972).
211. E.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (person convicted of violating
law prohibiting distribution of contraceptives held to have standing to assert constitutional claim of unmarried individuals). In his dissent, Chief Justice Burger contended
that "[t]he Court today blithely hurdles th[e] authoritative state pronouncement" that
the anti-distribution provision "served the legitimate interest of the State in protecting
the health of its citizens [by permitting dispensing only through medical channels]." Id.
at 467. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971) (Court holds violative of due
process a state law permitting spouse or official without a hearing to forbid for a year
tie sale of liquor to person who has been declared by a court to be an excessive
drinker). The state courts should have been given an opportunity to rule on the patently
unconstitutional state statute "[slince no one could reasonably think that the judges of
Wisconsin have less fidelity to due process requirements of the Federal Constitution
than we do." Id. at 440 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
212. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 215-17 (1976) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
213. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 460 (1973) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
214. Id. at 462.
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Justices Powell and Rehnquist have made clear their opposition
to massive busing. 2 15 The Chief Justice's attitude appears to have
shifted dramatically toward that view. In 1971, he spoke for the Court
in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,216 endorsing
extensive district court remedial authority to order cross-town busing,
though noting that factors of health or adverse effect upon the educational process might serve to restrict that remedy. 217 The following
year, he expressed growing uneasiness over interference with school
board discretion and he would have sustained the attempt of a board,
then under a desegregation order, to carve out a new district. 2 18 In
1974, his Court opinion in Milliken v. Bradley219 opposed interdistrict
consolidation absent a showing "that there has been a constitutional
violation within one district that produces a significant segregative effect in another district." 220 Two years later, he concurred in Austin
Independent School District v. United States,2 2 ' identi4ring residential patterns as the principal cause of urban racial imbalance. Accordingly, he agreed that in such situations only "rarely" would it be
proper for a court order to "result in the widespread busing of
elementary age children."2 2 2 Most recently, the Chief Justice has
supported Court action vacating some busing orders either as not
being based on a sufficient showing of segregative intent or as being
beyond district court authority. 22 3 Despite his apparent shift in attitude on the busing issue, the Chief Justice did write the 1977 opinion that upheld judicial authority to compel a state, implicated in the
constitutional violation, to finance a range of educational components
22 4
to remedy the plaintiffs' injuries.
The Chief Justice's views apparently have undergone marked
change on the abortion question as well. He concurred in the landmark Roe v. Wade22 5 decision which voided state prohibitory legislation; however, he subsequently joined with a new majority in deny215. See notes 124-25 supra.
216. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).

217. Id. at 30-31.
218. Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 471 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
219. 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (Milliken I).
220. Id. at 745.
221. 429 U.S. 990 (1976) (mem.) (Burger, C.J., joining in concurring opinion of

Powell, J.).
222. Id.
223. See note 50 supra.
224. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977) (Milliken II).
225. 410 U.S. 113, 207 (1973) (Burger, C.J., concurring). The Chief Justice emphasized that "the Court today rejects any claim that the Constitution requires abortion
on demand." Id. at 208.
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ing any constitutional right to federal financial assistance in obtaining
an abortion.2 26 Even more revealing, in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 22 7 he concurred in Justice White's dissent which would have
upheld substantial restrictions, and not only financial ones, on the
freedom of a pregnant woman to have an abortion. Such conditions
included spousal veto, 22 8 parental veto in the case of an unmarried
minor, 2 29 and prohibition against use of a basic--perhaps indispens2 30
able-technique of abortion after the twelfth week.
In a legislative apportionment case, United Jewish Organizations
v. Carey,2 31 which challenged a district gerrymandered to guarantee
a majority position for blacks, deemed to have been the subject of
prior discrimination, Chief Justice Burger alone labeled the plan a
"strict [racial] quota approach."2 32 Thus, he dissented from
the views
of his colleagues who sustained the legislation based upon either
broad national authority,2 33 state reserved power, 2 34 or both.2 35
In Bakke,2 36 the Chief Justice joined in Justice Stevens' opinion
which found that the special admissions program employed by the
University of California at Davis violated a federal statute.2 3 7 The
opinion did not reach the constitutional issue. Judging, however,
from Burger's dissent in the legislative districting case, 238 in the absence of the statute, he probably would have found the classification
at issue a quota violative of the fourteenth amendment.
Undoubtedly, Chief Justice Burger's role as titular leader exerts
pressure upon him at times to take positions that he otherwise would
not take as a sitting Justice. In his recent opinions, however, especially in race relations and abortion contexts, he appears to be exhibiting his basic philosophy of judicial restraint.
JUSTICE WHITE
The Chief Justice and the other Court members naturally reflect
upon the practical implications of their decisions. Byron White, in
226. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
227. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
228. Id. at 92-94.
229. Id. at 94-95.
230. Id. at 95-99.
231. 430 U.S. 144, 180 (1977).
232. Id. at 182 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
233. Id. at 155-65.
234. Id. at 179-80 (Powell, J., joining in concurring opinion of Stewart, J.).
235. Id. at 147-68 (White, J., wrote the plurality opinion, in which Stevens, J.,
joined upholding the districting on both grounds).
236. Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 98 S.Ct. 2733 (1978).
237. Id. at 2809-15.
238. See note 231 supra and accompanying text.
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particular, stresses that pragmatic aspect.239 According to a former
law clerk, Lance Liebman, he sees his role as "challenging him to
choose the [reasoning] that will serve the nation over time," 240 freely
acknowledging that the Court makes new law and that it should be
ever mindful of the impact of its decisions. He is an important
middle-of-the-roader in fourteenth amendment litigation. At times,
especially in equal protection cases, he has aligned himself with
Brennan and Marshall.2 4 1 Yet, in other cases, his views set him apart
from those two Justices. 242 Thus, he has de-emphasized the significance of a showing of disproportionate racial impact, 243 indicated his
hesitance over extensive busing,2 4 and demonstrated a marked re2 45
straint in substantive due process contexts.
Justice White's candid remarks in Miranda v. Arizona,2 46 a fifth
amendment case, reveal his pragmatic approach quite vividly. In
Miranda, the majority held that absent warnings to the suspect about
his right to remain silent and the availability of counsel, admissions
obtained during in-custody interrogation violated the constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination. In White's mind, the majority was
wrong in its analysis; however, they were not in error merely because
the holding was "neither compelled nor even strongly suggested by
the language [of the amendment], [was] at odds with American and
English legal history, and involve[d] a departure from a long line of
precedent."2 4 7 Rather, according to White, the majority was wrong
because of its misjudgment regarding the consequences of the decision. Justice White agreed that the Supreme Court in interpreting
"great clauses of the Constitution" 248 necessarily must "make new
law
and new public policy."2 49 Nevertheless while the "Court's text and
reasoning should withstand analysis and be a fair exposition of the
. . . provision [,]250 . . . [e]qually relevant is an assessment of the
rule's consequences measured against community values." 2 51
Such practical considerations played a dominant part, according
239. See notes 246-56 infra and accompanying text.
240. The Court is in Two Factions Now, and Justice White is in the Middle, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 8, 1972, § 6, at 16.
241. See notes 270-74 infra and accompanying text.

242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

See notes 246-51 infra and accompanying text.
See note 275 infra and accompanying text.
See note 276 infra and accompanying text.
See notes 278-80 infra and accompanying text.
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Id. at 531 (White, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 537 (emphasis added).

HeinOnline -- 14 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1129 1978

1130

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14

to Liebman, in White's contrasting positions in two open-housing
cases. In the first, Reitman v. Mulkey, 2 52 Californians, through referendum, had incorporated a provision into their state constitution
permitting racial discrimination in housing soon after the state legislature had passed an open-housing law. Justice White found state action present in the individual homeowner's racial discrimination, construing the concept liberally. Had White not concluded as he did,
Liebman explained, the "movement for open-housing laws," then underway, "might [have been] dealt a major setback." 2 53 By contrast, in
the second case, Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 2 54 White declined to
interpret a post-civil war statute as containing an open-housing component, especially in light of recent passage of federal legislation on the
subject. According to Liebman, White believed that the majority's
action sacrificed "consistent legal reasoning and accurate statutory interpretation . . .for no important purpose," and a "gratuitous insult"
was handed to Congress. 255 That body was told in effect "that its long
and courageous struggle to secure new legislation had been unneces25 6
sary. "
Justice White's pragmatism is revealed in several fourteenth
amendment cases. In San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodrigitez2 57 he felt that "[school] districts with a low per-pupil real
estate tax base" 2 58 "utterly failed to extend a realistic choice to pa-

rents .

He viewed the interdistrict consolidation remedy in-

"..."259

Milliken v. Bradley260 as both appropriate and practical. The majority, he said, had suggested "that judges should not attempt to grapple
with the administrative problems attendant on a reorganization of
school attendance patterns." 26 1 To White, it was "precisely this sort
of task which the district courts [had] been . . . exercising 262 since
Brown v. Board of Education.2 63 He dissented in a school corporal
discipline case, 26 4 in which the Court declined to require any prior
due process hearing. As White reasoned, any supposed tort rem252. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
253.

See Court is in Two Factions,supra note 240, at 98, § 6.

254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.

392 U.S. 409, 449 (1968) (White, J., joining in dissent of Harlan, J.).
See Court is in Two Factions,supra note 240, at 98, § 6.
Id.
411 U.S. 1 (1975).
Id. at 64 (White, J., dissenting).
Id. at 65.
418 U.S. 717 (1974).
Id. at 778 (White, J., dissenting).
Id.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
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edy-as a substitute for the prior due process hearing-was "utterly
' 2 65
inadequate to protect against erroneous infliction of punishment.
Moreover, he added, the fear of the majority that requiring such a
due process hearing would result in "a 'significant intrusion' into the
discipline process [was] exaggerated." 2 66 Finally in Bakke, 2 67 Justice
White reflected, in part, upon the practical implications of a private
cause of action under Title VI,268 in concluding that Congress had not
269
intended to incorporate that remedy in the statute.
In some equal protection contexts, Justice White has voted along
with the Brennan-Marshall wing. He joined in the Brennan dissent
which would have upheld the University of California at Davis special
admissions program setting aside places for minority students. 2 70 He
had earlier endorsed their view that classifications grounded upon
gender should be deemed suspect, 2 71 and he agreed with Marshall
that a spectrum of standards 2 72 would best serve Court analysis. Like
Brennan and Marshall, he believes that there is substantial national
authority, political 273 as well as judicial, to remedy past racial discrimination. He also feels that there is extensive state reserved power
274
to redress such injuries.
Nonetheless, Justice White's middle stance is clear. In a leading
public employment case, 2 75 he spoke for the Court in declining to
265. Id. at 693.
266. Id. at 700.
267.
268.

Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 98 S. Ct. 2733 (1978).
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970).

269. As Justice White reasoned:
Nor do any of these statements [in the legislative history] make nice distinctions between a private cause of action to enjoin discrimination and one to cut
off funds, as Mr. Justice Stevens and three justices who join his opinion apparently would .... [I]t would be odd if they did, since the practical effect of
either type of private cause of action would be identical ....
[In either case]
recipients of federal funds would be presented with the choice of either ending
what the court, rather than the agency, determined to be a discriminatory practice within the meaning of Title VI or refusing [to accept] federal funds....
Both types of action would equally jeopardize the administrative processes so
carefully structured into the law.
98 S. Ct. at 2798.
270. Id. at 2737.
271. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
272. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 458 (1973) (White, J., concurring).
273. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (White, J., joins opinion by
Brennan, J., upholding congressional authority under the fourteenth amendment to ban
English literacy tests for certain Puerto Rican voters).
274. See United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 162-68 (1977) (White, J.,
concurring) (White maintained that the Constitution permits a state to redraw legislative
districting lines to favor blacks victimized by prior discrimination).
275. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 299 (1976) (the issue was purposive discrimination).
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find constitutionally determinative the disproportionate failure rate of
blacks on a police entrance examination. Recently, he has endorsed
the Court's opinion in a school case which appeared to narrow the
' 27 6
concept of "desegregation."
In procedural due process cases, once White is satisfied that a
liberty or property interest is present, he takes the lead in urging a
due process hearing requirement;2 7 7 however, in a number of
instances involving substantive challenges to legislation concerned
with abortion, 2 78 exclusionary zoning, 2 79 and housing28 0 he has been
disinclined to find such a constitutionally protected interest. In other
contexts as well 28 1 Justice White's votes suggest his swing position.
Somewhat more activist in equal protection cases and more
restraintist in substantive due process situations, Justice White's
pragmatism is a central component of his approach.
276. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976) (White, J., joining in majority opinion).
277. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 683 (1977) (White, J., dissenting);
Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 355 (1976) (Court finds no entitlement under state law
sufficient to guarantee a terminated local policeman a right to due process hearing)
(White, J., dissenting); Goss v. Lopes, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (Court per Justice White finds
entitlement to public education under state law requiring due process hearing prior to
suspension of student even for a few days).
278. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 221-22 (1973) (Court fashioned "a new constitutional right . . . with scarcely any reason or authority . ,. (interfering with] the people
and the legislatures of the 50 states") (White, J., dissenting). Eight years earlier, however, he had voted to strike down a state birth control counseling restriction as intruding
upon the "intimacies of the marriage relationship." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 502-03 (1965) (White, J., concurring).
279. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 542 (1977) (ordinance preventing grandmother from having her two sons' children live with her found to violate due
process clause) (White, J., dissenting).
280. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (Court per Justice White sustains state
law limiting tenant defenses for the purpose of eviction hearing). As Justice White declared, "We do not denigrate the importance of decent, safe, and sanitary housing. But
the Constitution does not provide judicial remedies for every social and economic ill."
Id. at 74.
281. He has joined with Justice Brennan in the latter's broad reading of national
congressional authority under the commerce power, see National League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 856 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); and under the fourteenth
amendment, Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (Brennan, J.). See also Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 518 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S.
112, 229 (1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). Yet White concurred in the Chief Justice's restrictive standing approach to challenges by citizens of
national policy. See Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977) (Court per Justice White
held that federal court must abstain, given ongoing civil suit by state to recover welfare funds allegedly fraudulently obtained). His comments in other cases evidence a
willingness to be supportive of the political institutions and of public officials, especially in criminal matters. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 538 (1976) (White, J.,
dissenting); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 689 (1962) (state scheme for punishment of narcotic addicts held impermissible) (White, J., dissenting).
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JUSTICE STEWART
Potter Stewart, another swing member on the Court, is philosophically closer to Rehnquist and Burger. He agrees with the two in
rejecting any intermediate approach in equal protection cases although his threshold for finding irrationality in legislation may be
lower. His effort to side with the majority, however, is evident in
282
several ways: his liberal construction of post-civil war legislation;
his employment of the irrebuttable presumption doctrine;2 3 and
perhaps of greatest significance in understanding his approach, his
attempt to rely upon narrow grounds in particularly troublesome
cases. 284

Justice Stewart would place the label of judicial moderate or restraintist upon himself. His opinions and votes reveal a general willingness to defer to political decision making.2 8 5 Indeed, those opinions suggest a disposition to be supportive of state institutions even,
in certain contexts, when they are in conflict with the Congress. 28 6
282. See notes 297-98 infra and accompanying text.
283. See notes 299-303 infra and accompanying text.
284. See notes 299-314 infra and accompanying text.
285. Voicing opposition to the adoption of the "one-man, one-vote" standard, for
example, he declared: "What the Court has done is to convert a particular political
philosophy into a constitutional rule ....
[I cannot] join in the fabrication of a constitutional mandate which imports and ... forever denies to every State any opportunity for
enlightened and progressive innovation in the design of its democratic institutions ......
Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 748 (1964) (Court held that seats
in state legislature were malapportioned even though those in the lower house were
based upon population and the apportionment in the upper house had been endorsed
by a majority of voters; Court holds that apportionment in both houses had to be based
upon a strict population basis in order not to violate equal protection) (Stewart, J., dissenting). See also Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 537 (1977) (Stewart,
J., dissenting) ("To equate [the desire of a grandmother to have her sons' children live
with her] with the fundamental decisions to marry and to bear and raise children
[would] extend the limited substantive contours of [due process] beyond recognition.");
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 530-31 (1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (would
uphold the "uncommonly silly" anti-birth control counseling law since he could find no
"right of privacy" applicable to it).
In two other cases he appeared disinclined to find "state action" present so as to
impose federal constitutional requirements. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976)
(Court per Justice Stewart holds that there was no first amendment right to enter a
shopping center to picket in a labor dispute); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967)
(Court holds that state constitutional provision legitimating racial discrimination in
housing is "state action") (Stewart, J., joining in dissenting opinion of Harlan, J.).
286. In Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), he viewed the federal statute
seeking to create voting rights for 18-year-olds in federal and state elections as an unconstitutional intrusion upon the states' mandate to determine voter qualifications. He
joined in a dissent with Justice Harlan in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 659
(1966), challenging the majority's view that Congress had the authority under the fourteenth amendment to determine for itself whether a state had violated equal protection;
rather, argued the dissenters, the issue was for the judiciary to decide. He concurred in
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Stewart's recent position in Bakke 28 7 is not inconsistent with that
tendency. In Bakke, he joined in Stevens' opinion which invoked
Title VI as clearly dispositive. He was convinced that the federal
statutory policy obviously was superior to an inconsistent single state
university program.

To Justice Stewart, the traditional rational basis standard is the
appropriate test by which to assess ordinary social and economic legis-

lation not involving suspect classifications. 288 Even "chaotic" and "unjust"28 9 legislation might pass constitutional muster if based upon

some rational grounds. Nor should the government be required to
demonstrate a compelling state interest where such laws are chal90
lenged.2
No matter how philosophically out of step he may be with some
members, Justice Stewart has sought to find bases upon which to join
the majority. For example, in Craig v. Boren, 29 1 a recent gender
case, he relied upon the traditional rational basis approach to reach
the result achieved by the majority through its intermediate standard. 292 Thus, unlike Rehnquist and Burger, he found the state law
prohibiting males but not females eighteen to twenty years old from

purchasing beer "totally irrational." 293 While earlier he had rejected
the idea that there was any privacy right infringed by an "uncom-

he later joined in
monly silly" 294 birth control counseling prohibition,
2 95
the Court's pattern of abortion decisions.

Justice Rehnquist's Court opinion in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833
(1976). In United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 180 (1977), he seemed to
minimize the significance of the Federal Voting Rights Act, instead finding broad state
authority to employ "racial awareness," absent a showing of invidiousness.
287. Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 98 S.Ct. 2733 (1978).
288. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 214 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring).
289. San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 59 (1973) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
290. See, e.g., Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 (1974) (Court per Justice
Stewart found that exclusion of normal pregnancy and childbirth from state's disability
insurance system did not violate equal protection); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471,
487 (1970); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 638-39 (1969) (state law
prohibiting bachelor who neither owned nor leased real property from voting in school
district held invalid) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
291. 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (state law permitting females from 18-20, but not males of
the same age, to purchase beer invalidated by Court as violative of equal protection
clause).
292. Id. at 215 (Stewart, J., concurring).
293. Id.
294. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 527 (1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
295. In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), he considered himself bound by the
Griswold precedent. Id. at 168-70 (Stewart, J., concurring). He also took the position
that the "right [to beget a child] necessarily includes the right of a woman to decide
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." Id. at 170. Justice Stewart joined in the
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In race relations cases, Stewart consistently has supported majority positions. 29 6 Indeed, he spoke for the Court in its quite liberal
construction of two 100-year-old federal statutes, finding within them
prohibitions against racial discrimination in private housing transac298
tions2 9 7 and private schools.
Undoubtedly, the most distinctive aspect of Justice Stewart's role
is his effort to invoke narrow positions as dispositive, rather than to
reach the broader, more difficult constitutional issues. At times, of
course, his colleagues choose that course as well. But Stewart's effort
seems a more persistent one. His use of the irrebuttable presumption
2 99 and
doctrine was interpreted by dissenters as such an attempt,
while commendable, it was unsuccessful in their view. 30 0 It was seen
as the Justice's struggle to set limits upon use of the subjective compelling interest approach in the equal protection area. 30 1 Instead, Justice Stewart sought to bring the problems within a more manageable
due process context. Thus, the Court would not have to determine
whether a compelling interest was established, but would ascertain
whether the legislation in issue contained a conclusive presumption
that foreclosed a claimant from challenging its arbitrary application.
The approach has been called into question, not only by dissenters,
but also by Justices concurring in the judgments. 30 2 Its present status
30 3
is in doubt.
subsequent Court position which drew a distinction between the constitutional right to
freedom from laws interfering with the abortion decision, and the absence of a right to
compel states to provide financial assistance to indigents seeking abortions. Maher v.
Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977). But in a concurrence in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428
U.S. 52 (1976), he suggested that a limited parental consent requirement might be constitutional provided there was "judicial resolution of any disagreement between parent
and the minor, or . . . judicial determination that the minor is mature enough [herself]
to give an informed consent." Id. at 91.
296. See, e.g., Hills v. Gautreau, 425 U.S. 284 (1976) (Court per Justice Stewart
upheld metropolitan-wide remedy given the involvement of a federal administrative
agency in the housing violations); Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972)
(Stewart, J.).
297. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
298. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
299. See such reaction by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist in Vlandis v.
Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 459-69 (1973) (Burger, C.J. & Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
300. Id. at 460.
301. Id.
302. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 651 (1974) (Powell, J.,
concurring); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 459 (1973) (White, J., concurring).
303. See Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975) (Court per Justice Rehnquist
held nine-month marriage duration requirement for spouse to receive social security
benefits not violative of due process). But see Turner v. Department of Employment
See., 423 U.S. 44 (1975) (per curiam) (state law making pregnant women ineligible for
unemployment compensation during late pregnancy and immediately after childbirth
held void as creating "conclusive presumption").
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Justice Stewart's hesitance to reach the broader constitutional
questions has been apparent in various types of cases. In Frontierov.
Richardson,30 4 the four-member plurality had rested on a finding that
gender was a suspect classification. 30 5 Concurring in the judgment,
Justice Stewart briefly noted that the "statutes before us work an invidious discrimination in violation of the Constitution." 30 6 In Gedtddig v. Aiello, 30° he hardly took cognizance of the dissenters' argument
that excluding pregnancy disability from a state insurance coverage
constituted sex discrimination. He was satisfied that sufficient legitimate justifications existed for that exclusion; consequently any resulting discrimination was not invidious. 308 In Burton v. Wilnington
Parking Authority, 30 9 the majority had examined the totality of circumstances to arrive at the conclusion that the state had so entangled

itself with the actions of the restaurant owner engaged in racial discrimination that the owner's acts had constituted state action. Stewart
found it unnecessary to broaden the state action concept. As he saw
it, a particular state law as construed by the state court had purported
in effect to authorize the discrimination. 310 Similarly, in United States
v. Guest,31 1 he declined to reach the question whether Congress had
authority under the fourteenth amendment to punish private conspiracies. He found analysis of the question unnecessary by interpreting the indictment in Guest as containing "an express allegation of
state involvement .... "312 It is interesting to note that while Justice
Stewart announced the judgment of the Court, six members in two
concurring opinions thought it appropriate to reach that broader fourteenth amendment question. 31 3 The Justice's approach is evident in
31 4
other areas as well.

304. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
305. Id. at 682.
306. Id. at 691. See also Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (Court struck down as
violative of equal protection state law providing preference to male when both male and
female are equally qualified to serve as estate administrator; administrative convenience
deemed insufficient justification).
307. 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (denial of benefits under state disability insurance for
work loss resulting from normal pregnancy not violative of equal protection clause).
308. Id. at 494.
309. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
310. Id. at 726-27 (Stewart, J., concurring).
311. 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
312. Id. at 756.
313. Id. at 762 (Clark, J., concurring, joined by Black & Fortas, JJ.); id. at 777
(Brennan, J., concurring, joined by Warren, C.J. & Douglas, J.).
314. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (discussing in his concurrence the Tribunal's prolonged and convoluted attempts to define
hard-core pornography and commenting: "I know it when I see it .. "); Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643, 672 (1961) (concurrence did not reach the question whether unconstitu-

HeinOnline -- 14 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1136 1978

1978]

VIEWS OF THE NINE JUSTICES

In sum, while hesitant about reaching or discussing broader
constitutional issues, Justice Stewart seems motivated to join the
majority.
JUSTICE BLACKMUN
justice Stewart's concurrence in the landmark abortion decision
may have been a reluctant one. By contrast, Harry Blackmun sees a
fundamental judicial responsibility to safeguard a woman's procreative
privacy and thus has opposed efforts to diminish the availability of
abortion. 31 5 Outside that area, his pattern is a mixed one, but he has
taken an activist stance in some contexts. He has authored opinions
3 16
endorsing strict scrutiny of state legislation impinging upon aliens.
His dissent in Bakke 31 7 revealed his support for a broad Court role
in assuring meaningful affirmative action programs 318 and he has
called for expansive standing rules in environmental contexts. 3 9
Justice Blackmun's opinion in Roe v. Wade 320 announced a fundamental right of privacy which "encompass[ed] a woman's decision" 3 21 to have an abortion. He rejected as insufficient the state's
three supposed justifications for its prohibition: the effort to discourage illicit sexual activity, the danger involved to the pregnant woman,
and the interest in protecting prenatal life. The first justification,
Blackmun argued, was conceded by the state to be a weak
rationale. 3 22 As for the second, Blackmun asserted that abortion "in
early pregnancy . . . is now relatively safe." 32 3 As to the third, he
declared that "the judiciary . . . is not in a position to speculate
[about when life begins]. "324 Blackmun concluded, however, that
an unborn fetus is not a "person" within the meaning of the fourteenth
3 25
amendment due process clause.
The intensity of Justice Blackmun's endorsement of the abortion
right is seen in his opinions in several subsequent cases. He angrily
protested the majority's sustaining of laws denying financial aid to the
tionally seized evidence must be excluded, because the state law upon which prosecution was based was itself unconstitutional) (Stewart, J., concurring).
315. See notes 320-32 infra and accompanying text.
316. See notes 333-34 infra and accompanying text.
317. Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 98 S. Ct. 2733, 2806 (1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
318. See notes 343-53 infra and accompanying text.
319. See notes 357-58 infra and accompanying text.
320. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
321. Id. at 153.
322. Id. at 148.
323. Id. at 149.
324. Id. at 159.
325. Id. at 158.
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indigent woman seeking an abortion when the same laws granted
such assistance to a woman carrying the fetus to full term. 3 2 6 To him,
this was "almost reminiscent of 'Let them eat cake.' "327 The result of
such laws was that a "presumed majority . . . punitively impresses
upon a needy minority its own concepts of the socially desirable."3 2 8
In another context, he had no difficulty in finding that physicians
seeking to perform abortions possessed standing to assert the constitutional rights of their clients.3 29 Blackmun spoke for the Court in
rejecting legislation which would have imposed three additional restrictions upon the abortion right: spousal veto,3 30 "absolute" parental
veto in the situation of an unmarried minor,33 1 and prohibition of a
33 2
particular aborting technique after a given period of pregnancy.
In other fourteenth amendment cases, Blackmun has spoken for
the Court in striking down state laws infringing upon the rights of
aliens.3 3 3 They are deemed a "prime example of a 'discrete and insular' minority . . . for whom heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate."33 4 In other contexts, he has been less disposed to invalidate
government action. He had been disinclined to view classifications
based upon gender as suspect,3 3 5 but now concurs in the recently

326. Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 462 (1977) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
327. Id.
328. Id. at 462-63.
329. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 117 (1976) (physicians have standing to assert the constitutional rights of their clients because of the risk that a patient might be
reluctant to participate in a public court suit and the danger of "imminent mootness").
330. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67-72 (1976).
331. Id. at 72-75. Justice Blackmun emphasized that not every minor, "regardless
of age or maturity, may give effective consent for termination of her pregnancy." Id.
at 75.
332. Id. at 75-79. Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court, sustained the legislative
requirement that a woman signify in writing her willingness to have an abortion. Id.
at 67.
333. See Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977) (state law denying college financial
assistance to aliens who choose not to declare intent to apply for citizenship was held to
violate equal protection); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973) (Court held that
prohibition of alien employment in civil service violates equal protection); Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (state law denying welfare to resident alien held to
violate equal protection). Justice Blackmun, however, has favored a more restraintist
judicial attitude towards federal statutes affecting aliens. See, e.g., Hampton v. Mow Sun
Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 117 (1976) (Court held that statutory exclusion of resident aliens
from the Federal Civil Service violates due process because the exclusion was not related to the Civil Service Commission's delegated concern with efficiency) (Rehnquist,
J., joined by Blackmun, J., dissenting).
334. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (citation omitted).
335. See Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975) (Court per Justice Blackmun found
no rational basis for state law extending male minority to 21, but terminating female
minority at 18, for purposes of child support).
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framed intermediate test.3 36 Yet, even in the gender classification setting, he continues to exercise judicial restraint. Thus he joined in a
dissent by Rehnquist which urged that the Court give more weight to
the government's "administrative convenience" argument in the federal social insurance context. 337 Rehnquist argued that the Social
Security Administration must deal with millions of applications; and
promptness are placed
accordingly, important values of accuracy 33and
8
in jeopardy by excessive judicial scrutiny.
Justice Blackmun is reluctant to vote to overturn classifications
based upon illegitimacy. He emphasizes that while the appropriate
scrutiny is "not a toothless one . . . the burden remains upon [those
challenging the classification] to demonstrate the insubstantiality of
[the means chosen]." 3 39 Earlier, the Justice had concurred in a disin later
sent which deemed poverty a suspect classification, 340 34but
1
position.
that
from
away
moved
have
to
cases he appears
In the race relations context, Blackmun ahnost always has voted
343 His
with the majority. 342 He did not do so, however, in Bakke.
support of the Brennan dissent and his own brief dissenting remarks
displayed a substantial commitment toward preferential admissions
programs for minorities. As did Brennan and Marshall, he emphasized that the Court must come to grips with the reality of race relations in America. He declared that "to get beyond racism, we must
first take account of race . . . . [T]o treat some persons equally, we
must first treat them differently.- 344 He "suspect[ed] that it would be
impossible to arrange an affirmative action program in a racially neut-

336.

See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).

337. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 224 (1977) (Court held that denial of social
security benefits to widowers who are unable to show dependency upon deceased wage
earners violated Constitution) (Rehnquist, J., joined by Blackmun, J., dissenting).
338. Id. at 225.
339. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510 (1976) (citation omitted) (Court per Justice Blackmun upholds denial of social security benefits to certain classes of illegitimates).
340. James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
341. See United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 446 (1973) (Court per Justice
Blackmun upholds state requirement that individual pay $50 fee as a prerequisite to
bankruptcy relief; the Court found no "fundamental right" to that relief, especially since
the legislation fell within the area of "economic and social welfare"). Justice Blackmun
also joined in San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), finding no
equal protection violation, notwithstanding the widely disparate per-pupil expenditures.
342. But see Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 471 (1972) (Burger, C.J.,
joined by Blackmun, J., dissenting).
343. Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 98 S.Ct. 2733, 2806 (1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
344. Id. at 2808.
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ral way and have it successful." 34 5 While Allan Bakke, the disappointed white candidate to the medical school, might have been a
victim of the program, Blackmun wondered "who is to say" that
others excluded by other valid governmental remedial efforts, sustained by the Court, have not also been victimized equally.3 4 6 Furthermore, he argued that a preference being given to a class of applicants should not be determinative since university and govern34 7
mental preference systems are commonplace.
Nor was it advisable for the Supreme Court to intrude upon a uni3 48
versity's admissions process. The Tribunal simply is "ill equipped"
to resolve that all-too-complex problem: "Among the qualified, how
does one choose?" 3 49 Nor was there any clear, constitutionally meaningful line between the Davis fixed-number-of-places approach and
the Harvard rating system. In both, "subjective application is at
3 50
work."
The need, therefore, was to interpret the equal protection clause
with "breadth and flexibility and ever-present modernity" 35 1 to make
certain that it did not "perpetrate racial supremacy." 3 52 While the
clause may have grown in its mandate, Justice Blackmun contended
that it has not "broken away from its moorings and its original intended purposes" 35 3 of protecting the ex-slave and his descendents.
Justice Blackmun has been hesitant to read the liberty or property concepts broadly; 3 54 however, once he has been satisfied that a
constitutional right has been created by state law, he asserts that "the
federal Constitution, not state law [should determine] the process to
be applied in connection with any State decision to deprive [anyone]
of it." 3 55 Constitutional due process must be accorded to the indi3 56
vidual with such an interest.
345. Id.
346.

Id. at 2807.

347. Id. at 2808
348. Id. at 2807.
349. Id. at 2808

350. Id. at 2807.
351.

Id. at 2809.

352. Id. at 2808.
353. Id. at 2807.
354. See, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) (Blackmun, J., joins Rehnquist, J.,
in the majority opinion). But see Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977)
(Blackmun, J., joins Powell, J., in plurality opinion declaring Ohio housing statute void
as a deprivation of "liberty").
355. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 361 (1976) (Blackmun, J., joins White, J., dissenting). But see Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (Blackmun, J., joins majority
in finding that corporal punishment engages a due process interest, but that no prior
hearing is thereby required; the Court was satisfied that subsequent state court common
law relief for "aberrational" abuse would be adequate to protect students).
356. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 361 (1976) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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In fourteenth amendment cases outside the area of abortion decisions, Justice Blackmun is most well-known for his activist stance in
the area of environmental law. He has called for an "imaginative expansion of our traditional concepts of standing . . . to enable an organization such as the Sierra Club . . . to litigate environmental issues." 35 7 More recently, he contrasted improper federal interference
with state public employee salary scales, on the one hand, with broad
national authority to compel state compliance with federal environmental standards, on the other. 358
While perhaps labeled as a moderate or restraintist, Justice
Blackmun has voiced a strong judicial commitment to several kinds
of claimants: the pregnant woman seeking an abortion, the alien
challenging restrictive state laws, the black applicant benefiting from
minority-preference admissions programs, and the environmental
group seeking standing.
JUSTICE STEVENS
John Paul Stevens is closer than Blackmun to the BrennanMarshall wing of the Court. Yet, in a number of respects, his opinions evidence an independent stance. He argues that the Court has
used a single equal protection standard all along; hence, he believes
that close examination must be made in a particular context, and the
members must be "especially vigilant '35 9 in applying that standard to
classifications appearing to incorporate outmoded and inaccurate
stereotypes. In race relations cases, he supports the Tribunal's new
emphasis on the need for establishing purposive discrimination;
nevertheless, he does not downgrade the importance of disproportionate impact in determining intent. Unlike Brennan and Marshall,
he construes Title VI to forbid university admissions policies
grounded upon race. Outside the race context, he is more willing
than his two associates to read state legislative authority broadly. He
has disagreed with them on some abortion issues, stressing state
power over minors. Finally, in several due process contexts, his expressions attest to his independent posture and show a disposition to
be supportive of state courts.
Critical of the multi-tiered approach in equal protection cases,
Stevens maintains that in actuality the Supreme Court has "employed
357.

Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 757 (1972) (standing under Administra-

tive Procedure Act to environmental group seeking to challenge construction of recreation area in national forest denied) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
358. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 856 (1976) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
359. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 520 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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. . . a single [equal protection] standard in a reasonably consistent
fashion." 36 0 He believes that it is more fruitful to assess carefully the
"reasons motivating particular decisions" than to try to "articulate [the
standard] in all-encompassing terms." 3 61 Such an examination reveals
that, in Justice Stevens' mind at least, the Court properly pays close
attention to classifications which seem the product of habit. "Habit,
rather than analysis, makes it seem acceptable and natural to distinguish between male and female, alien and citizen, legitimate and
Justice Stevens feels that in the past there
illegitimate .... .362
was much "the same inertia in distinguishing between black and
white." 36 3 Therefore, he contends that such a "stereotyped reaction
may have no rational relationship---other than pure prejudicial
discrimination-to the stated purpose for which the classification is
3 64
made."
In race relations cases, he has taken a position somewhat at variance with that of Brennan and Marshall. Unlike those Justices, he
endorses the majority's new focus upon the claimant's burden to establish purposive discrimination, not merely disproportionate impact
of government action upon a racial minority. His concurrence in
vshington v. Davis365 sought to emphasize the evidentiary weight
of such impact. 366 In United Jewish Organizations v. Carey,3 6 7 he
endorsed Justice White's reading of state reserved power as affording a sufficient basis for framing legislative districting plans that took
race into account in redressing past discrimination. Finally, he expressed uneasiness over the statutory construction by which postcivil war legislation was interpreted loosely to achieve present
36 8
national goals.
Justice Stevens, in his concurring opinion in Bakke, 36 9 also
360.

Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 212 (1976) (Stevens, J.,concurring).

361. Id.
362. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 520 (1976).
363. Id.
364.
365.

Id. at 520-21 (citation omitted).
426 U.S. 229 (1976).

366. Justice Stevens stated, that "the most probative evidence of intent will be
objective evidence of what actually happened rather than evidence describing the subjective state of mind of the actor. For normally the actor is presumed to have intended
the natural consequences of his deeds." Id. at 253. His point was that "the line between
discriminatory purpose and discriminatory impact is not nearly as bright, and perhaps
Id. at
not quite as critical, as the reader of the Court's opinion might assume .
253-54.
367, 430 U.S. 144 (1977) (Stevens, J., joins White, J., in the majority opinion). Only
Justice Stevens joined Justice White's view that there were two independent basesfederal and state-for sustaining the apportionment plan.
368. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 190-91 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring).
369. Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 98 S.Ct. 2733, 2739 (1978).
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parted company with his two senior colleagues. He did so not only on
the statutory question involved, but also on the appropriateness of
addressing the more troublesome constitutional issue.
To him, the meaning of Title VI was "crystal clear." 370 The provision was intended to forbid the kind of government action which
had taken place-exclusion of a candidate from a federally supported
3 71
program on the basis of race.
Furthermore Stevens maintained that resolution of the statutory
issue 3 72 was dispositive. 373 No broader constitutional question regarding the general matter of affirmative action programs had to be considered. Indeed, it was not proper for members to address that question because no class action was involved in the case before the
Court. 3 74 The litigation simply involved one individual's challenge to
the process being applied to his candidacy. Accordingly, the question
whether "race can ever be used as a factor in an admissions decision
is not an issue in this case, and . . . discussion of that issue is inappropriate." 3 75 By focusing narrowly, he avoided examination of the
much more volatile subject: the constitutionality of affirmative37 6action
programs to redress injuries caused by societal discrimination.
In the abortion setting, Justice Stevens' views differ from those
of Brennan and Marshall as well. Justice Stevens found valid a distinction between state prohibitory legislation and the failure of a state
to provide financial assistance to indigents to get abortions, and he
concurred in the Court's decision3 77 to sustain the right of a state to
370. Id. at 2812. "[Njothing in the legislative history justifies the conclusion that
the broad language of [the statute] should not be given its natural meaning." Id. at 2814.
371. Id. at 2814.
372. Justice Stevens had no difficulty in assuming that Title VI permits a private
cause of action. He argued that the question, whether a private cause of action existed,
was "not properly before us" since the question was not raised below by the university.
Id. He strongly intimated, however, that if he were to reach the question, he would find
that such a cause did exist. Id.
373. Id. at 2811. Justice Stevens added, however, that if the university prevailed
on the statutory issue, then the Court would have to confront the constitutional question. Id.
374. Id. at 2809.
375. Id. at 2810. For a contrary view, see Justice Powell's opinion. Id. at 2747.
376. Justice Stevens stated, "It is always important at the outset to focus precisely
on the controversy before the Court." 1d. at 2809. He noted that "[flour members of the
Court have undertaken to announce the legal and constitutional effect of this Court's
judgment .... It is hardly necessary to state that only a majority can speak for the Court
or determine what is the 'central meaning' of any judgment of the Court." Id. n.l. He
continued, "It is particularly important to do so in this case because correct identification of the issues will determine whether it is necessary or appropriate to express any
opinion about the legal status of any admissions program other than petitioner's." Id. at
2809.
377. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
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deny such aid. Furthermore, he would have upheld state legislation
requiring parental consent before an unmarried minor could undergo
an abortion. 378 In a related case, he deemed "frivolous" the argument
that a minor had a "constitutional right [to
use] contraceptives" not379
withstanding the wishes of parent or state.
Justice Stevens has acknowledged that "[national] power over
aliens is of a political character . . . subject only to narrow judicial

review." 380 Nevertheless, he voted to strike down a federal civil service regulation excluding nonresident aliens as beyond the Commis38
sion's mandated concern for an efficient service. '
In cases involving due process challenges, Justice Stevens again
reveals his distinctive approach. In Bishop v. Wood, 3 2 for example,
he wrote for the Court in finding that a fired policeman had no constitutional right to continued employment; therefore, the policeman
had no due process hearing right. Justice Stevens emphasized that a
federal court was not the appropriate forum to review public agency
personnel decisions, even though "numerous individual mistakes are
inevitable. "' 3

3

In another case, 38 4 he suggested that he agreed with

Justice Brennan that injury to reputation implicated a liberty interest. 3 5 He went on, however, to offer the possibility that an
adequate state court remedy might satisfy due process requirements
even absent federal statutory relief.38 6 In a third opinion, this time a
concurrence in Moore v. East Cleveland,3 7 Stevens employed a more
deferential standard than did Powell in his plurality opinion. The case
involved an ordinance which sought to put limits on the freedom of
extended families to live together. The Powell opinion had employed
378. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 101 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Such a view stems, in part, from Justice Stevens' belief that a legislature may
properly assume that "most parents will be primarily interested in the welfare of their
children... " Id. at 104.
379. Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 713 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring).
380. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 101-02 n. 2 1 (1976).
381. Id. But see Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977) (Stevens, J., joining majority in
sustaining federal statute denying certain immigration preferences to illegitimates);
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976) (Court per Justice Stevens upheld federal law
denying medicare to aliens not resident for at least five years).
382. 426 U.S. 341 (1976).
383. Id. at 349-50.
384. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens did not participate in Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976). In his Ingraham dissent,
however, he made reference to that case. 430 U.S. at 701.
385. Id. at 702.
386. Id.
387. 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (ordinance preventing grandmother from having her two
sons' children live with her violated due process).
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an intermediate standard in testing legislation when "the government
intrudes on choices concerning family living arrangements.- 38 8 Justice
Stevens invoked the limited standard of review applicable in zoning
38 9
cases and stressed traditional property rights.
The new Justice, then, appears to establish a number of bridges
to the center from his independent base.
II.

WHO SPEAKS FOR THE COURT?

Having considered the role of each of the nine current Supreme
Court Justices, one must shift focus and ask which judge or grouping
appears to speak for the Tribunal. Clearly, none of the members is so
far out of step that he does not at times write the Court opinion in a
fourteenth amendment case. For example, Justice Brennan, portrayed
along with Justice Marshall as positioned on one end of the spectrum
framed the recent Court intermediate standard to be used in gender
classification cases. 90° Justice Marshall wrote for the Court in announcing the right of prisoner access to adequate law library materials. 3 91 The two Justices, however, with their commitment to a liberal district court access policy and a more substantial judicial role in
protecting racial minorities and the politically weak, are not in the
mainstream of the Court. Nor for that matter is Justice Rehnquist,
especially in equal protection cases in which he readily finds bases
upon which to sustain the actions of political institutions. 392
To the extent that the Chief Justice aligns himself with Justice
Rehnquist in such instances, he also does not represent majority
thinking; however, his opinions in standing cases 39 3 generally achieve

majority support. More important, he is the official leader of the Supreme Court. He represents his colleagues before the other branches
of government and in public addresses. Undoubtedly as his predecessors did, he occasionally restrains his impulse to dissent3 9 4 in
order to present the image of a unified Tribunal and to maintain his
influence upon doctrinal development.
Of the five remaining Justices, three appear to be the major
central force of the Court, though by no means a cohesive voting
388. Id. at 499.
389. Id. at 520.
390. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
391. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
392. See notes 121-23 supra and accompanying text.
393. See note 209 supra and accompanying text.
394. It is probable that his initial positions in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
and Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971), reflected that
effort rather than his true attitude, given his later shifts. See notes 216-27 supra and
accompanying text.
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bloc. They are Justices Powell, White, and Stevens. Each has a
somewhat different perspective concerning Court responsibility; yet
together their approaches generally attract a stable majority. Justice
Powell is the most important in that regard. His views on access
limits, 3 95 his substantial deference to other institutions,3 96 and his
employment of intermediate levels of scrutiny in certain kinds of
cases3 9 7 have won support. But Court members may not be ready to
accept his thinking in school desegregation settings.a9 8 For example,
no other Justice in the swing group endorsed the non-exclusionary
voluntary affirmative action programs endorsed by Justice Powell in
Bakke.3 99 As a practical matter, given the even Court split, the Court
majority is committed, at least for the present, to Powell's position.
Furthermore, it is likely that had Stevens reached the constitutional
issue, he would have supported Powell's position as well.400
Justice White's focus upon an inquiry into "purposive discrimination," 40 1 rather than mere determination of race impact, is favored by
a majority of the Court. Perhaps he is somewhat more activist 40 2 in
equal protection cases and more restraintist 4°3 in substantive due
process contexts than most other members. Nonetheless, this pragmatic, long-time swing member should be expected to gain adherents
to his position.
Justice Stevens seems drawn to the center. He does not wish to
involve himself in the debate regarding the number of levels of equal
protection scrutiny. He contends that his colleagues have employed a
single standard 40 4 all along and should get on with the business of
applying it with care, being especially searching where stereotyping
may be present. 40 5 Perhaps his opinion in Bakke, 40 6 narrowly focusing upon the statutory issue, is another instance of his effort to have
the Court avoid confrontation over volatile constitutional issues where

395.

See notes 145-50 supra and accompanying text.

396. See notes 165-73 supra and accompanying text.
397. See notes 154-56 supra and accompanying text.
398. See notes 162-63 supra and accompanying text.
399. Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 98 S. Ct. 2733 (1978).
400. This supposition is based upon his general pattern in equal protection cases
and his broad endorsement of race-conscious remedial relief to enforce the Voting
Rights Act. See note 367 supra and accompanying text.
401. See note 275 supra and accompanying text.
402. See notes 261, 271-72 supra and accompanying text.
403. See notes 278-80 supra and accompanying text.
404. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 212 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring).
405. See notes 362-64 supra and accompanying text.
406. Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 98 S. Ct. 2733, 2809 (1978) (Stevens,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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another avenue is available and dispositive. 40 7 His efforts to join in a
broad Court consensus are evidenced by his expressed sentiments in
other contexts as well: his willingness to employ the phenomenon of
purposive discrimination as determinative (while still emphasizing the
importance of disproportionate impact), 40 8 his counsel of restraint in
public employment situations, 40 9 and his assumptions about state
4 10
court competence.
III.

A.

THE COLLECTIVE PORTRAIT

The Court's View of its Responsibilities

Giving somewhat more weight to the priorities of Justices Powell, White, and Stevens, but taking into account the perceptions of
their colleagues, the author suggests the following enumeration as
positions now endorsed by the Burger Court:
1. A claimant should be denied standing absent personal injury
(or imminent threat) brought about by the government action being
called into question. 4 11 Some vague stake in the outcome or
generalized grievance will not suffice, nor will injuries to third persons, unless there is strong reason to permit the claimant to assert
the rights of third persons.4 12 Rather, other prudential 4 13 considerations should be taken into account. These include reflecting upon the
strength of the causal link between the plaintiff's present situation
and the challenged government conduct, as well as the likelihood that
the judicial relief sought will redress the injury. The Court believes
that no remedy should sweep more broadly than is necessary.
2. The primary responsibility for policy making lies with the
elected branches; the Supreme Court has only narrow responsibility. 4 14 When it appears that classifications may be the result of improper stereotyping or may interfere with personal rights deemed
worthy of judicial protection, the Court should examine such regulations closely.4 15 Otherwise, it should seek to defer to the other
branches of government. The Court cannot be expected to provide
407. See note 376 supra and accompanying text.
408. See note 366 supra.
409. See notes 382-83 supra and accompanying text.
410. See notes 383-86 supra and accompanying text.
411. See note 145 supra.
412. See notes 147, 329 supra and accompanying text.
413. See notes 146-50 supra.
414. See notes 145, 170, 172, 207 supra and accompanying text.
415. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 725 (1977); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976);
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
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relief in every case when political unfairness or arbitrary government
416
action may have taken place.

3. Specifically, it is for the Congress and the state legislatures,

not the Court, to develop comprehensive policies regarding national
4 17
concerns. Where it appears that the national and state legislatures
have made serious efforts to deal with such matters, the Court should
exhibit judicial restraint. Absent judicial findings of purposive discrimination, it is for those political institutions to choose either neutral racial policies or affirmative action programs 4 18 benefiting the
minority-whether it be in apportionment,4 1 .9 employment, 42 0 public
4 22
school assignment, 42 1 or university admissions.
What is the permissible scope of such affirmative action programs? Bakke is important to consider in seeking an answer. Yet
given the four-one-four split in the Court, much is left unresolved;

however, Bakke and other case law suggest the following:
A. Affirmative action programs are constitutional. Race may be
considered as a factor. 423 That is, the Constitution does not forbid
voluntary governmental programs in which the racial status of a
minority applicant is weighted positively in considering his applica424
tion on an individual basis.
B. Governmental exclusionary race preferences 4 25 offend the
416. See note 280 supra.
417. Where there is a conflict between Congress and a state, of course, federal
law-provided it is deemed in pursuance of the Constitution-will preempt any state
policy that stands as an "obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
418. See, e.g., United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
419. Id.
420. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (Court noted that Congress, without showing purposive discrimination, may prohibit by statute private
employment testing that has disproportionate racial impact).
421. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971). In
dicta, the Court endorsed school district authority, absent purposive discrimination, to
take race into account for racial balance. Id. at 16.
422. See generally Regents of theUniv. of Calif. v. Bakke, 98 S. Ct. 2733 (1978).
423. Id. (Powell, Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, White, JJ.). The latter four would
go further, of course. Id. at 2782-94 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
424. Id. at 2764. Voluntary school board busing to improve racial balance probably
need not proceed on an individual basis, since the program works no total exclusion
from the system. This is in contrast to a voluntary university race-conscious minority
admissions program even where race is only a factor. See note 421 supra.
425. The Court would be unlikely to label an acceptable fixed racial preference as
a "quota." Yet the label "quota" or "goal" is not automatically determinative. See
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 25 (1971) ("use . . . of
mathematical ratios [to remedy de jure race segregation in the public schools] was no
more than a starting point in the process of shaping a remedy, rather than an inflexible
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Constitution unless established upon demonstrated need by authoritative 42 6 governmental bodies. Only authoritative findings42 7 by the appropriate judicial, legislative, or administrative institution or agency
4 28
that fixed racial percentages are needed to redress discrimination
requirement") (Burger, C.J.). But see Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 98 S. Ct.
2733, 2748 (1978) ("semantic distinctions" between goals and quotas are beside the
point; in this case there was a "line drawn on the basis of race and ethnic status" which
marked a total exclusion) (Powell, J.). In Bakke, both courts below characterized the
classification as a quota. Id. at 2748 n.26. Justice White in his separate opinion in United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 147 (1977) stated:"[A] re-apportionment cannot
violate the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment merely because a State uses specific
numerical quotas in establishing a certain number of black majority districts." Id. at 162
(emphasis added). Chief Justice Burger, dissenting, labeled the apportionment there an
objectional "strict quota approach." Id. at 182. The term "quota" may connote either
acceptance of the unqualified to meet a fixed number or percentage or a continuation of
the preference for a period or to a degree beyond the need for remedying discrimination. Governmentally established goals with reasonable and flexible timetables for private institutions seeking government contracts probably would continue to pass constitutional muster.
426. See Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 98 S. Ct. 2733, 2759 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring). Of course, Justice Powell spoke only for himself here. Justice Brennan in his opinion for the four dissenters did not disagree outright with the requirement
for an authoritative government body. Rather, he contended that "the manner in which
a State chooses to delegate governmental functions is for it to decide." Id. at 2788 n. 4 2.
He maintained that the university regents who established the program were an authoritative body under the California Constitution.
In employment situations, in which the challenged classifications are established by
the legislature or a rule making agency, Justices Powell and Stevens' opinions suggest a
willingness to find those bodies "authoritative."
427. Id. at 2755 n.41. The concept of findings apparently is construed broadly to
include consent decrees where employer-defendant enters into settlement while disclaiming allegations against him. See, e.g., EEOC v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 419 F.
Supp. 1022, 1040 (E.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd 556 F.2d 167 (3d Cir. 1977) (while AT & T
disclaimed the discrimination, the disclaimer being typical in consent arrangement, the
district court would "treat [the case] as if the [allegations] had in fact been proven at
trial"). See N.Y. Times, July 4, 1978, at 2, col. 8.
428. An authoritative government body may properly determine that a violation
has taken place requiring exclusionary racial classification (not a color-blind approach)
although no discriminatory intent has been proven. See Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters,
98 S. Ct. 2943 (1978) (defendant may rebut prima facie case of discrimination in
employment "treatment" by showing it was "reasonably related to achievement of some
legitimate purpose." Id. at 2950. There is no additional obligation to show the method
was directed toward consideration of the qualifications of the "largest number of minority applicants." Id.); Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 568 (1974) (discussed by Powell, J.,
in Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 98 S. Ct. 2733, 2756 (1978): "Lau .. .rested
solely on the statute, which had been construed by the responsible administrative
agency to reach educational practices 'which have the effect of subjecting individuals to
discrimination.'" The Court found a statutory violation in the "failure of the San Francisco school system to provide remedial English instruction for ... students of oriental
ancestry who spoke no English .... Id. at 2755); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792 (1973) ("disparate treatment" and burden shifting); Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 435-36 (1971) (under Title VII, where there has been a "disparate
impact" upon racial minorities or women, employer has burden of establishing that the
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will permit employment of such percentages. 429 Otherwise, the Suqualifying test used is sufficiently job-related).
Bakke involved a racial classification by a state university. While such a classification by a private university probably would not violate the Federal Constitution, given
the absence of state action, it no doubt would violate Title VI which speaks in terms of
"any" program, so long as it is receiving federal monies. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976).
429. Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 98 S. Ct. 2733 (1978). Although it is
true that Powell spoke only for himself there, one must take account of his middle
position on the Court. It is fair to conclude that Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Rehnquist-probably no more predisposed than Justice Powell toward claims by racial
minorities-would require such an authoritative body. Indeed, Chief Justice Burger
even dissented to the remedial approach in United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S.
144 (1977), even though it was endorsed by the Justice Department and a state legislature. Justices Stewart and Stevens probably would require such a body as well. The
other Justices might choose not to disagree with the text proposition, but might disagree
over whether a particular governmental unit was "authoritative." See 98 S. Ct. at 2787
n.42 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Friday v. Uzzell, 98 S. Ct. 3139 (1978) (racial
preference in student senate and disciplinary panel).
The Court is likely to require that exclusionary percentage preferences, even by an
"authoritative" body in order to pass constitutional muster, must be remedial in nature
to cure individual, group, or perhaps industry-wide discrimination, not merely abstract
societal discrimination. This probably would be so even in the case of federal legislation. But the Justices doubtless would seek, if possible, to construe the legislation to
meet that condition. An alternative strategy would be for the Court to construe the legislation as not intending the classification which was administratively created. The Court
avoided reaching the question whether the Public Works Employment Act of 1977,
42 U.S.C.A. § 6705(0(2) (Cum. Supp. 1978), providing 10 percent of federal contracts
to minority employers, was constitutional. The four Justices in the Brennan group likely
would sustain the statute as consistent with the commitment owing racial minorities
under the Constitution. A fifth Justice could be found to vote to uphold, given the disposition of the latter five Justices to defer to the authoritative political institutions.
Moreover, at least one among that second group probably would satisfy himself that
implicit findings, at least with regard to industry-wide discrimination, served as a predicate for the congressional remedial effort. But see note 54 supra.
The Court would have difficulty sustaining the collective bargaining agreement at
issue in Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 563 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1977). In
that case, a collective bargaining agreement, entered into to seek to abide by Exec.
Order No. 11,246, 60 C.F.R. 2 (1977), calling for the preferential hiring of minority men
and women (one minority male or woman for every white male hired) was found to
violate Title VII. The federal district court made a determination that there had not
been any prior employer discrimination. Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp.,
415 F. Supp. 761 (E.D. La. 1976), aff'd, 563 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1977). The executive
order was issued in pursuance of federal legislation and thus could not override express
congressional intent. (See Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 98 S. Ct. at 2743 n.12
(Stevens, J.), citing McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 280 (1976):
"Title VII prohibits racial discrimination against . . . white petitioners . . . upon the
same standards as would be applicable were they Negroes .... ). The Court could rule
narrowly-if the Tribunal were to hear the Kaiser case-finding that the collective bargaining agreement went beyond the requirements of the executive order.
Court construction of statutes and administrative regulations is a major and complex
task for the Justices. Sharp disagreement about the proper interpretation perhaps can be
expected most particularly in cases of percentage exclusion. When Justices on the one
side find Title VI "crystal clear" in prohibiting the exclusion, and Justices on the other
side deem legislative history conclusive to permit it notwithstanding a statute's "cryp-
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preme Court will hold unconstitutional a program using them. This
of the nonwill be the case no matter how "benign" the purposes
4 30
program.
the
instituting
unit
governmental
authoritative
4. Where a federal court has ordered substantial busing, the
Court must scrutinize the record to assure itself that invidious discrimination-and not residential patterns or other neutral causes4 31
is responsible for the current condition.
5. The states, administering public law and providing essential
community services, are important parts of our constitutional system.
Congress should not intrude upon their financial capacity to carry out
their responsibilities. 43 2 The state political institutions should be assumed to act in good faith unless there is sufficient evidence to the
contrary. States should be encouraged to provide adequate levels of
4 33
governmental services grounded upon equitable funding policies.
6. A federal district court is ordinarily not an appropriate forum
4 34
to review the multitude of public personnel decisions.
7. State judges are assumed to be as committed as their federal
counterparts to enforcement of constitutional guarantees-whether in
cases of alleged infringement of personal liberties or those in which
4 35
property rights are at issue.
B.

An Assessment of the Collective View
1.

The inclination to rely upon the state courts

Implicit in the collective portrait is a disposition by the present
Court to place much more reliance than the Warren Court would
tic" language, then the Justices' value predispositions doubtless play some role. See,

e.g., Vorcheimer v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976), aff'd by
equally divided court, 97 S. Ct. 1671 (1977) (Rehnquist not taking part).
430. See Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 98 S. Ct. 2733, 2751-53 (1978).
Justice Stevens, speaking for four Justices, found the statute controlling. Id. at 2815. No
doubt the four presumed that the university had benign objectives, but obviously such
purposes could not immunize a program in conflict with the federal statutes. It is unclear how they would have stood absent the statute. But it is likely a majority could be
mustered to accept the proposition. Once again, the issue may turn not on the significance of benign purpose, but on whether the particular governmental unit instituting
the program was "authoritative." Id. at 2809-15 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also notes 187-90 supra and accompanying text.
431. See note 50 supra.
432. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (no congressional
power, even plenary commerce power, to apply federal minimum wage law to state and
local government employee salaries, in traditional government areas, in order to protect
state functioning).
433. See San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 53-59 (1975).
434. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 349 (1976).
435. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693
(1976).
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have placed upon state courts to safeguard individual rights. The
Court's current orientation is seen in its recent abstention decisions, 43 6 its narrowing of federal habeas corpus relief in fourth
amendment cases, 43 7 its construction of section 1983,438 its restrictive
standing requirements, 439 and its employment of the "causation" doctrine 440 to deny or limit access.
This willingness to trust the state tribunals is unfortunate because it assumes an essential parity between the federal and state
courts. Such parity in competence and commitment to constitutional
norms is questionable. 44 1 Our fifty state court systems offer widely
disparate levels of ability and differing perspectives regarding their
constitutional duties. While far from perfect, the federal courts present a marked contrast. On balance, they attract individuals of higher caliber to the tenured federal bench; their traditions embody a
greater sense of obligation to enforce constitutional safeguards;
their institutional environment is subject to the direct supervision
of the Supreme Court; and they possess a more uniform, and generally higher level of competence.
The framers, however, had entrusted to state tribunals the power
to enforce the Bill of Rights. Under the Constitution, only the
United States Supreme Court had to be established; the framers
left it to Congress to determine whether to set up a more elaborate
federal court system. By the Supreme Court's decisions, a new opportunity is being presented to the state courts. They can vindicate that
renewed faith by demonstrating that any disparity between the two
court systems is not a substantial one and will be narrowed.

436. Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327
(1977) (federal court must abstain from interfering with state contempt proceeding for
failure to pay civil judgments or to answer creditor subpoenas for information).
437. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
438. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
439. See notes 35, 145, 209 supra. The author opposes such restrictions unless
there is risk that permitting access will result in undue continual monitoring of the executive branch.
440. See notes 149, 158, 163, 167 supra. The causation notion, borrowed from torts,
involved no physicist's determination of cause and effect, but rather implicates policy
factors. The Court should not misuse the concept by employing it to deny relief at that
threshold stage. Only where the absence of a link between injury and defendant's conduct is patent should the Court invoke the doctrine.
441. Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1105 (1977). Neuborne contends that the Court is acting out of a belief that state courts will interpret rights narrowly.
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2.

The disposition to be supportive of other organs
of government
The propositions reveal a closer scrutiny of the elected institutions in certain particulars. The Burger Court, for example, has formulated new doctrines restricting such organs in drawing classifications based upon gender, 442 illegitimacy, 44 3 alienage, 444 and family relations. 445 It has limited state power to confine the mentally
ill446 and extended prisoner rights. 4 47 Thus contrasted with pre-1954
Courts, the Burger Court is not restraintist, but it is deferential, attempting not to interfere with social and economic policy. 4 48 Given
the nature of the Court as an institution and the principle of democratic governance, however, the new direction is a sound one.
There are inevitable risks in that approach, of course. One risk
relates to the essentially "political" perspective of the executive or
legislative official. Even the most "activist" judge is restricted by the
judicial environment of records, briefs, and legal argument. By contrast, while the politician may reflect at times upon the fairness of
some proposed government action, he probably lacks both the time
and the inclination to develop a continuing constitutional perspective.
A second risk lies in expecting any institution to monitor its
own actions. Deference to the states or to the Congress will not automatically foster a greater sense of constitutional obligation. National
442. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
443. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
444. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
365 (1971).
445. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).

446. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (state confinement of mentally ill
individual without treatment or any demonstration that confinement was necessary for
his safety or that of community held violative of due process).
447. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
448. See notes 39, 52, 175, 341 supra. In Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke,
98 S. Ct. 2733 (1978), eight Justices were restraintists. Chief Justice Burger, and Justices
Rehnquist, Stevens and Stewart deferred to the will of Congress. Id. at 2815. Justices
Brennan, Blackmun, Marshall and White deferred to the state university program after
determining that the federal statute was not controlling-especially given the assessment of the constitutional commitment owed to racial minorities. Id. at 2766. The ninth
Justice, Justice Powell, at least indicated his inclination to be deferential to university
affirmative action programs. See id. at 2739. Such an inclination presupposes the good
faith of university officials in implementing a program which is not used automatically
to exclude applicants. Thus, he would defer where minority race status was only one
factor in considering applicants on an individual basis. Id. Apparently, he would defer
to such an admissions program even where the admissions committee recognized that a
small pool of minority students might create a sense of isolation among these students,
thereby making it more difficult for them to develop and achieve their potential. See id.
at 2764-66 (Appendix describing Harvard College Admissions Program).

HeinOnline -- 14 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1153 1978

1154

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14

League of Cities v. Usery44 9 protected the states' fiscal integrity from
federal legislation, but that case does not assure either that the Court
will hold the states to a constitutional obligation 450 to provide basic
services or that the states will commit themselves to furnish such
benefits. As for the Congress, it is instructive to remember that suspicion about that body's disposition to exercise only those powers
granted by the Constitution led to the adoption of the Bill of Rights.
Notwithstanding such risks, there is no viable alternative to placing substantial trust in the political institutions. No single institution
can shoulder the task of constitutional protection. The active support
of other organs, as well as the toleration of key constituencies is indispensable to any meaningful implementation of declared rights.
Even if the Court on its own could effectively enforce such
rights, the politically unpopular and "insular" should think twice
about particular reliance upon the Supreme Court. Although the
Warren Court came to be perceived by diverse disadvantaged groups
as their protector, the institution has not identified with those groups
historically. Some contend that the body usually will reflect a conservative bias, as would any institution composed of old, propertied, professional, non-minority males. Admittedly, some judges may feel
themselves well-insulated from outside pressures, and free to
reexamine their basic premises. Others may speak from an egalitarian
or consumer perspective. Nonetheless, an individual who would look
to the Court must gamble that new appointees will endorse his value
positions.
There are other internal institutional factors that lead to hesitancy to impose a grandiose responsibility upon the Court. Its basic
structure is that of an appellate court. Only through the prism of the
case-the record from below, the appellate briefs, the oral arguments, the limited research by clerk and judge-can the judge get a
sense of the nature of the case and its broader implications. Such a
process is an inadequate mechanism 45 1 for gathering and comprehending the broader "legislative" or impact facts. Yet sound policy
requires meaningful assessments of the nature of a problem and the
likely impact of alternative courses of action.
449.

426 U.S. 833 (1976).

450. See Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The New Federalism and
Affirmative Rights to Essential Governmental Services, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1065 (1977).
Tribe contends that at least the logic of Usery, if not the Court's design, will support the

development of such a constitutional obligation.
451. See Miller & Barron, The Supreme Court, the Adversary System, and the
Flow of Information to the Justices: A PreliminaryInquiry, 61 VA. L. REv. 1187 (1975).
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Admittedly, the legislative process does not guarantee a better
result, but at least that process is more open-ended because of the
greater range of witnesses testifying in the rough and tumble hearing
rooms, the research machinery available and the expanded potential
input from the public. Therefore, it is more likely that the elected
branches will come closer to an acceptable accommodation of vital
interests. In addition, mistakes in policy development by them are
more easily rectified. In contrast, changes in court doctrine must
await appropriate future cases and may be delayed further by concerns about overruling precedent. Although it is no small task for a
legislative body to reverse itself, such an institution at least is a selfstarter.
More important, should major national policy come from a nonelected body? There is endless debate concerning the nature of our
democracy and the place of the Court. One side, viewing the Court
as antimajoritarian, argues that it should be restricted in its role.
Another side sees it as a positive force in making our unique constitutional democracy work. Whatever one's perspective, however, most
agree that Court policy-making on too broad a scale violates the
democratic principle.
IV.

CONCLUSION

This study has presented the Justices' differing viewpoints regarding their responsibilities. It has offered a collective portrait, as
well, particularly stressing the key roles of Justices Powell, 452
White, 45 3 and Stevens. 45 4 The author criticizes the present inclination
of the Court to place greater reliance upon the state courts4 55 but
endorses the current philosophy of deference to the elected institutions. 4 56 The search must be for meaningful, narrowly based Court
restrictions 457 upon the actions of such political bodies. In acknowl-

452.
453.

See notes 144-201 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 243-81 supra and accompanying text.

454. See notes 359-89 supra and accompanying text.
455. See notes 436-41 supra and accompanying text.
456. See note 451 supra and accompanying text.
457. The author believes that Justice Powell's opinion in Regents of the Univ. of
Calif. v. Bakke, 98 S. Ct. 2733, 2738 (1978), is such an appropriate narrow based approach. It incorporates two central values: the interest in consideration of the individual
as an individual, and the interest in recognizing the reality of racial minority status in
America. Admittedly, it makes a major assumption: that officials will implement a voluntary program in good faith while continuing to consider the applicant as an individual.
Doubtlessly, there is not enough time and energy to monitor each program to assure
that it is not simply a race quota system; however, the author feels that it is worth the
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edging its own limited role, the Tribunal is in a better position to
gain the support of both the elected organs and key community leaders. In placing some clear boundaries upon political decision making,
it can prod the governmental institutions into placing important policy questions on their own agendas for serious consideration. Consequently, narrowly patterned interference would be consistent with

our twin ideals-ever in a state of tension-of majority rule and constitutional limits on democratic governance.
risk, rather than automatically reading out of consideration one or the other of those
central values.
There is risk, of course, even in an "authoritative" court's, legislature's, or agency's
remedial efforts based upon findings of prior identifiable discrimination or upon consent
decrees which take the allegations as "proven" for the purposes of remedy. See notes
426-30 supra and accompanying text. Fairness suggests that individuals or their representatives who would be affected adversely by such actions should be made parties
to the proceedings. Moreover, there should be a periodic examination to determine
whether injuries have been sufficiently addressed; only then can the basic value of
individual consideration be restored.
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